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ABSTRACT 
 
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Farmers program, first 
established by the Reform Act in 2002, assists farmers adversely affected by import 
competition through cash benefits and technical assistance. The Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 re-authorized and modified the program. The program has 
been mostly underused, with petitions filed for only 0.8% of all the state-level field 
commodities for which price data is available. In Chapter 2, I address this puzzle of 
low program participation by using the rare events logistic regression method and find 
that access to information and farmers’ incentives to file petitions, rather than factors 
from eligibility criteria, determine the program participation. Most notable changes in 
the Recovery Act of 2009 are the easing of eligibility criteria and the use of decoupled 
instead of coupled cash payments. In Chapter 3, using an inclusive model that allows 
for different policy settings—coupled and decoupled payments and different eligibility 
criteria—I find that the new seemingly “decoupled” TAA program, as well as the 
original “coupled” TAA program, distort prices and optimal outputs, and increase 
farmers’ welfare.  
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CHAPTER 1 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TAA FOR FARMERS PROGRAM 
 
I. An Overview 
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 first established the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA) programs for workers and firms dislocated by international trade liberalization, and the 
TAA for Farmers program was established by the TAA Reform Act of 2002
1
. The TAA for 
Farmers assists farmers adversely affected by import competition through cash benefits up to 
$10,000 a year and technical assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. To 
certify for the TAA benefits, a group of farmers should meet the following criteria: (i) The 
commodity should be classified as Agricultural Commodity
2
 defined by the Secretary of 
Agriculture. (ii) The price for the commodity in a given marketing year should be less than 
80% of the national average price in the 5 preceding marketing years. (iii) The increases in 
imports of the commodity or like product contributed importantly to the price decline. The 
Secretary of Agriculture determines whether the group of producers meets these requirements. 
Once a group of farmers is certified, cash payment will be made to individual producers if 
they meet the following conditions: If (i) The producer produced the commodity in the most 
recent year; (ii) the producer's net farm income (as determined by the Secretary) for the most 
recent year is less than that for the latest year in which no adjustment assistance was received, 
and (iii) the producer has met with an Extension Service employee or agent to obtain 
information and technical assistance that will assist the producer in adjusting to import 
                                                 
1
 P.L. 107-210, Sections 141-142, approved August 6, 2002, 116 Stat.946 (19 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.). 
2
 “The term 'agricultural commodity' means any agricultural commodity (including livestock) in its raw or natural 
state.” (Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210, Sec 291) 
2 
competition with respect to the adversely affected agricultural commodity. The funding for the 
program expired in December 2007. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
3
 (abbreviated ARRA, the 
“stimulus package”) made a substantial change in the eligibility criteria. The act reauthorized 
the Trade Act for 2002, and provided an expanded definition of terms and more lenient group 
eligibility requirements for TAA petition. The major changes in ARRA of 2009 included the 
following: First, the eligibility requirements for groups of farmers to be certified and the 
criteria for individual farmers to be eligible for benefits became more lenient. The new Act 
required that the price of the most recent marketing year is less than 85% of the previous 3 
year prices instead of 80% of the previous 5 year prices. Moreover, not only the national 
average price, but also quantity of production, or the value of production, or the cash receipts 
for the commodity may be used for eligibility assessment. Also, unlike the prior TAA for 
Farmers program, there was no such requirement for the farmers’ net farm income to have 
decreased in order to be qualified for the cash payment. Another notable change was the way 
the financial assistance was given to farmers. Under the Reform Act of 2002, the cash 
payments to eligible farmers were calculated based on the formula involving the amount of 
production. However, the ARRA of 2009 abandoned such cash payment formula and stated 
that the cash benefits would be given to farmers to develop and implement business plans, 
with a maximum cap of $12,000. First, farmers need to complete intensive training courses 
aiming to improve the competitiveness of production and to develop the initial business plan. 
If the initial business plan is approved, a farmer can receive a maximum of $4,000 to 
implement the plan. The farmers whose initial plans are approved can develop a long-term 
business plan to adjust to import competition. The ARRA of 2009 included a sunset clause 
                                                 
3
 P.L. 111-5, Division B, Subtitle I, Sections 1856, 1881-1887, and 1891-1894, approved February 17, 2009 
3 
that the Act expires on December 31, 2010. Hence, the Act authorized the funding only 
through year-end 2010. However, eligible producers were able to access technical and 
financial assistance during calendar year 2011 if USDA had already approved their crops for 
TAA benefits. Program benefits were also available if producers filed a petition before 
January 1, 2011 and if the eligibility was established. Hence, the USDA received petitions for 
FY 2011 from May 21, 2010 to July 16, 2010. 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011(TAAEA, P.L. 112-40) effective on 
October 21, 2011, extended the provisions of the TAA for Farmers program. TAAEA 
authorized, but did not appropriate, $90 million each for FY 2012 and FY 2013, and $22.5 
million for the first quarter of FY 2014. No major change was made in the eligibility criteria. 
<Table 1.1> shows a comparison of the TAA for Farmers program under three different 
regimes. 
  <Table 1.1> TAA for Farmers program under three different regimes 
 Reform Act of 2002 ARRA of 2009 TAAEA of 2011 
Coverage Agricultural commodity in its raw or 
natural state. 
Any class of goods within an agricultural 
commodity and wild-caught aquatic species.  
Group 
Eligibility 
Requireme
nts 
 (i) The national average price for the 
most recent marketing year is less than 
80% of the average price for the 5 
preceding marketing years, and (ii) 
increases in imports like or directly 
competitive commodity, produced by 
the group contributed importantly to the 
decline in price. 
 (i) The national average price, or the quantity, or the 
value of production of, or the cash receipts for the 
agricultural commodity for the most recent 
marketing year is less than 85% of the average of the 
3 preceding marketing years, and (ii) the volume of 
imports of like or directly competitive products in 
the marketing year increased when compared to 
those of the 3 preceding marketing years; and (iii) 
the increase in imports contributed importantly to 
the decrease in those quantities 
Requireme
nts for the 
benefits 
(i) The producer produced the 
commodity in the most recent year; (ii) 
The producer's net farm income for the 
most recent year is less than that for the 
latest year in which no adjustment 
assistance was received; and (ii) The 
producer has met with an Extension 
Service agent for technical assistance. 
 (i) The producer produced the commodity in the 
marketing year when the petition is filed and in at 
least 1 of the 3 preceding marketing years;  (ii) The 
quantity produced by the producer in the marketing 
year has decreased; or the price received for the 
commodity has decreased compared to the average 
price for the 3 preceding marketing years; and (iii) 
No cash benefit was received under other TAA 
programs (i.e., the TAA for Workers and TAA for 
Firms programs), nor were benefits received based 
on producing another commodity eligible for TAA 
for Farmers. 
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  <Table 1.1> TAA for Farmers program under three different regimes (continued) 
 Reform Act of 2002 ARRA of 2009 TAAEA of 2011 
Income 
limit for 
benefits 
An applicant shall not be eligible to receive any cash benefit if the average adjusted gross non-
farm income of the person or legal entity exceeds $500,000, or if the average adjusted gross 
farm income exceeds $750,000.   
Benefits (i) Cash adjustment assistance: [{0.5  X  
(80% of the average price for the 5 
preceding marketing years - The price 
for the most recent marketing year)}  X  
The amount produced by the producer 
in the most recent marketing year] 
(ii) To receive the cash, the producer 
should get the technical training. 
(i) Initial and intensive technical assistance 
(ii) Up to $4,000 to implement an initial business 
plan 
(iii) Up to $4,000 to develop a long-term business 
adjustment plan (if not received any funding for 
initial business plan). If USDA approves the plan, up 
to $8,000 to implement the long-term plan 
 
Maximum 
cash 
assistance 
The maximum a producer may receive 
in any 12-month period shall not exceed 
$10,000 
A producer may not receive more than $12,000 
during the 36-month period following certification 
of the group petition.   
Applicable 
period 
FY2003 through FY2007 
(Oct. 1, 2002 – Sep. 30, 2007) 
FY2009, FY2010, 
and the first quarter 
of FY2011 
FY2012, FY2013, and the 
first quarter of FY2014 
Annual 
maximum 
funding 
level 
(i) $90 million per year available for 
FY2003 through FY2007 by the Trade 
Act of 2002. 
(ii) $9 million available for the first 
quarter of FY2008 (through Dec. 31, 
2007), by Section 1(c) of P.L.110-89.  
(iii) No funding authorized for the 
remainder of FY2008. 
(i) $90 million per 
year available for FY 
2009 and FY2010. 
(ii) $22.5 million 
available for the first 
quarter of FY2011 
(Oct. 1 -- Dec. 31 
2010) 
(i) Funding not to exceed 
$90 million per year for FY 
2012 and FY2013. (ii) 
Funding not to exceed 
$22.5 million for the first 
quarter of FY2014 (Oct. 1 -
- Dec. 31 2014) 
The TAAEA approved, but 
did not appropriate the 
funds to support this 
authority.  
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II. Program Activities 
 
State-level annual price data for agricultural commodities of the U.S. from 1997 to 2008 
was collected from the USDA (United States Department of Agriculture)’s NASS (National 
Agricultural Statistics Service) website
4
. The data includes field crops and not aquaculture 
products or wild-caught aquatic species. Data regarding the petition filing, such as petition and 
approval/denial date, and reasons for decision, were collected from the Federal Register
5
. 
Import data of agricultural commodities from 1997 to 2008 was also gathered from the GATS 
(Global Agricultural Trading System)
6
, a new on-line U.S. agricultural trade system launched 
by the FAS (Foreign Agricultural Service) in August 2009 that has data on both the volume 
and value of imports
7
. 
The number of petitions filed declined gradually from 2003 to 2007, with aquaculture 
products showing no petition filing in 2006 and 2007. With the funding for the TAA program 
under the 2002 Reform Act terminating in 2007, no certification/re-certification occurred and 
only denial/termination occurred in calendar year 2007. After introduction of the ARRA of 
2009, calendar year 2010 recorded the largest number of petitions. Also, the chances of being 
certified/re-certified are greater for aquaculture products (54%) than field crops (26%). There 
has been no petition filed after the calendar year 2010. The technical training assistance for the 
five commodities certified in 2010 -- asparagus, catfish, shrimp, lobster, and wild blueberries 
– continued until 2013 and ended as of September 29, 2013.  
 
                                                 
4
 http://www.nass.usda.gov/#top 
5
 http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/fr/notices.asp 
6
 http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx 
7
 The group eligibility criterion in 2002 Reform Act requires that “increases in imports of articles like or directly 
competitive with the agricultural commodity, or class of goods within the agricultural commodity, produced by the 
group contributed importantly to the decline in price.” However, in 2002 Reform Act, it is not clarified whether the 
“increases in imports” means increases in value of imports or in volume of imports.  
On the other hand, the group eligibility criterion in ARRA of 2009 requires “the volume of imports of like or 
directly competitive products produced by the group in the marketing year increased compared to the average 
volume of such imports during the 3 marketing years preceding such marketing year.” 
6 
<Table 1.2> All petitions filed and certified 
 
 
Petitions filed (all) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010* Sum 
Filed 15 20 22 11 4 27 99 
Certified 8 12 8 2 0 10 40 (40%) 
 
Petitions filed (field crops) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010* Sum 
Filed 4 6 9 11 4 13 47 
Certified 1 1 6 2 0 2 12(26%) 
 
Petitions filed (aquaculture products) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010* Sum 
Filed 11 14 13 0 0 14 52 
Certified 7 11 2 0 0 8 28 (54%) 
*For petitions filed in 2010, ARRA of 2009 is applied. 
 
[Figure 1.1] All petitions filed and certified/re-certified 
 
 
 
[Figure 1.2] All petitions filed for field crops and aquaculture products 
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 [Figure 1.3] All petitions certified/re-certified for field crops and aquaculture products 
 
 
<Table 1.3> below shows the number of new petitions (excluding the continuing 
petitions for re-certification) filed and certified. Note that the petitions filed in 2010 are all 
new petitions as the new rules under the ARRA of 2009 were applied. There were 69 complete 
new petitions from 2003 to 2010, of which 31 (45%) were certified and 38(55%) were denied. 
Also, among the 69 new petitions, 37 (54%) were regarding field crops and 32 (46%) were 
regarding aquaculture products. As in the previous case, number of petitions filed increased 
much in 2010 with the new rules in 2009. When a new petition is filed, the chances of being 
certified were greater for aquaculture products (63%) than field crops (30%). 
 
<Table 1.3> New petitions (excluding continuing petitions) filed and certified 
 
New petitions filed (all) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010* Sum 
Filed 15 11 9 3 4 27 69 
Certified 8 5 6 2 0 10 31 (45%) 
 
New petitions filed (field crops) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010* Sum 
Filed 4 5 8 3 4 13 37 
Certified 1 1 5 2 0 2 11 (30%) 
 
New petitions filed (aquaculture products) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010* Sum 
Filed 11 6 1 0 0 14 32 
Certified 7 4 1 0 0 8 20 (63%) 
*For petitions filed in 2010, ARRA of 2009 is applied. 
8 
[Figure 1.4] New petitions filed and certified 
 
 
 [Figure 1.5] New petitions filed for field crops and aquaculture products 
 
 
[Figure 1.6] New petitions certified for field crops and aquaculture products 
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Appendix I shows the petitions filed certified/re-certified, and Appendix II shows 
the petitions denied/terminated. Commodities for which petitions (including continuing 
petitions) were filed the most include Shrimp (29), Lobster (7), Salmon (7), Concord grapes 
(6), and Blueberries (4). States that filed the most petitions (including continuing petitions) 
include Florida (15), California (9), Ohio (6), Maine (6), and Idaho (6).  
Some simple findings from the price data are as follows:
8
 Petitions were ever filed for 
approximately 0.8% of all the commodities at state level for which price data is available: 
Among the 2,959 state-level field crops, petitions were ever filed for 23 commodities during 
2002-2007. Revised group eligibility under the ARRA of 2009 is more lenient for producers 
to be qualified as eligible, and it is supported by the data gathered. Below is an approximate 
comparison of the numbers of eligible commodities under the two criteria – The Reform Act 
of 2002 and the ARRA of 2009. Looking at the number of states that produce the commodities 
that satisfy group eligibility, we can see that the numbers are always bigger using the 
eligibility criteria under the new Act.  
 
<Table 1.4> Number of state-level commodities satisfying the group eligibility criteria for 
TAA  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
TAA 
Reform 
Act of 
2002 
Eligible 
(all obs.) 
211 
(2,352) 
164 
(2,691) 
198 
(2,644) 
152 
(2,591) 
79 
(2,578) 
119 
(2,524) 
85 
(1,528) 
Petitions filed 
(% of eligible) 
- 
4 
(2.4%) 
5 
(2.5%) 
8 
(5.3%) 
3 
(3.8%) 
4 
(3.4%) 
- 
ARRA of 
2009 
Eligible 
(all) 
299 
(2,349) 
293 
(2,649) 
296 
(2,640) 
274 
(2,586) 
137 
(2,575) 
243 
(2,523) 
190 
(1,529) 
                                                 
8
 Note that, for some of the observations where petitions were filed, the price data is not consistent with the results 
from the petitions. Among the 23 observations of field crop commodities for which petitions were filed and data is 
available, 5 observations were inconsistent with the results of petitions. For instance, California naval orange 
producers filed a petition in 2004 and the petition was denied by the reason other than price, but the petitioned price 
actually did not decline by more than 20% from previous 5 years. 
Some of this inconsistency is resulting from the fact that the petitioners submitted price data from local authorities 
such that the decision to file a petition is based on that data source, not based on the NASS data. For instance, the 
state of Idaho filed a petition regarding fresh potatoes in 2005. They submitted the price data from the Idaho 
Agricultural Statistics Office. 
 
 
10 
[Figure 1.7] Number of eligible commodities under the Reform Act of 2002 and the ARRA of 
2009 
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III.  Conclusion 
 
Observations from this chapter is the following: First, the TAA for Farmers program has 
been mostly underused since the introduction in 2002, with petitions filed for only 
approximately 0.8% of all the state-level field commodities for which price data is available. 
Second, the eligibility criteria became more lenient with the new ARRA of 2009, and 
accordingly, the number of petitions filed increased substantially during the calendar year 
2010. Third, the chances that petitions are approved are higher for aquaculture products (54%) 
than field crops (26%). 
The first observation above motivates the Chapter 2 of this thesis. In Chapter 2, I try to 
attack the puzzle of low program participation considering factors such as access to 
information and incentives of farmers as well as eligibility criteria. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
impact of the TAA for Farmers program, using a generalized model that allows for both the 
coupled and decoupled government payment schemes. By making different assumptions on 
the eligibility criteria and the payment scheme, I aim to analyze the impact of the program on 
the optimal outputs, prices, and welfare. Thus, the second observation above and the 
implication of the lenient eligibility criteria will be revisited in Chapter 3. Due to the 
limitation of data, aquaculture products are not included in the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DETERMINANTS OF PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 first established Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
programs for workers and firms dislocated by international trade liberalization, and the TAA 
for Farmers program was established by the TAA Reform Act of 2002 (“Reform Act”). The 
program assists farmers adversely affected by import competition through cash benefits up to 
$10,000 per year and technical assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. To 
certify for TAA benefits, the price of the commodity in a given marketing year should be less 
than 80% of the national average price in the five preceding marketing years, and increases in 
imports of the commodity or like product must have demonstrably contributed importantly to 
the price decline. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (abbreviated 
ARRA) revised the Reform Act, making the eligibility criteria less strict. With the new Act, 
the price of the commodity should be less than 85% of the average price of three preceding 
marketing years. Also, the volume or the value of imports should show an increase, and the 
causality between the increase and the decline in prices should be proved. Most recently, the 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011 (abbreviated TAAEA) reauthorized the 
program until the fiscal year 2014.  
Data shows that, between 2003 and 2007, the TAA petitions were filed for only about 
0.8% of all the commodities at state level. This chapter starts by questioning why farmers’ 
participation in the TAA program had been meager, by investigating the various determinants 
of farmers’ participation in the program. The chapter aims to evaluate the TAA for farmers 
program under the 2002 TAA Reform Act in terms of participation, to discuss the 
13 
appropriateness of its reform in ARRA of 2009, and to give policy implications on optimal 
design of future TAA policy.  
There is a two-step decision making process in the TAA for Farmers program. First, 
farmers decide whether to file a petition or not. Once farmers file a petition, the USDA FAS 
(Foreign Agricultural Service) investigates the data to approve/deny the petition. I focus on 
the farmers’ side of decision making and examine the factors affecting farmers’ participation 
in the TAA program taking three groups of factors into account: eligibility criteria, access to 
information, and incentives. Hypothesis with respect to each of the factors is set and is 
empirically tested. Data on TAA petitions-- dates of petitions and approval/denial decisions, 
commodity and groups involved in filing petitions-- from year 2003 to 2007, commodity 
prices and imports, and state farm characteristics from 1997 to 2008 was collected from the 
USDA’s NASS (National Agricultural Statistics Service), GATS (Global Agricultural Trade 
System) database, ERS (Economic Research Service), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. A 
“Rare events logistic” estimator was used instead of the traditional logit model to account for 
the large disparity of 0s and 1s in the dependent variable – farmers’ petition filing decisions. 
Robustness test is done in two ways, (i) using the fixed effect logistic regression that takes the 
commodity fixed effect into account, and (ii) using only the observations that price eligibility 
is satisfied. The results are mostly consistent. First, price, import, and income eligibility 
criteria are either insignificant to the petition-filing behavior or show signs contradictory to 
our hypotheses. Second, better access to information and know-how acquired by observing the 
previous cases of approval of similar commodity significantly increases the chances of 
petition filing. Third, incentives are significant in the decision making. Specifically, states that 
experienced a recent decrease in direct government payments are hypothesized to have higher 
financial incentives and thus file more petitions, and these hypotheses are supported. Also, 
14 
risk-related incentives are shown to be significant, with coefficient of variances of prices 
showing positive and significant impact on petition-filing. 
There have been only a few studies on the TAA for Farmers program which have 
primarily focused on the issue of eligibility criteria. According to Bacho et al. (2008), out of 
69 complete petitions reviewed from 2002 to July 2007, 41 (59.4%) turned out to be ineligible 
for program benefit by USDA FAS. The study points out failure to meet eligibility criteria as a 
major reason for ineligibility, and thus suggests to relax eligibility requirements. Another 
study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2006) also directs 
strict eligibility criteria as well as low cash payments as potential factors that discourage 
farmers from participating in the program. This study tries to answer whether it is the strict 
eligibility criteria that create the low participation of farmers. 
The contribution of this chapter to the TAA literature is as follows: First, the data set 
which encompasses TAA petition, price, import, and farm characteristics of state-level 
commodity data can be used as a knowledge base for future TAA studies. Second, this study is 
the first rigorous attempt to answer the questions of TAA program participation using the rare 
events logistic estimator. Last but not least, the study uniquely examines the role of 
information and incentives, which were mostly ignored in the previous TAA literature. 
Rationale for including these factors could be found outside the TAA literature. I focus on the 
extension as a potential source of information based on Feder and Slade (1984) and Whitacre 
(2008), and on the role of education based on Mishra and Park (2005). Also, assuming risk-
averse farmers influenced by Moscardi and Janvry (1977), Binswanger (1980), Dillon and 
Scandizzo (1978), risk-reducing effect of TAA benefits are used as a measure of incentives.  
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II. Hypotheses 
 
[Figure 2.1]  The conceptual framework  
 
 
 
[Figure 2.1] provides the conceptual framework of the decision making processes related 
to the TAA program-- petition-filing decision by farmers as potential participants and 
approval/denial decision by the FAS (Foreign Agricultural Service). First, petition-filing 
decision is made by farmers who take into account eligibility criteria and incentives for filing 
petitions given available information. Once petitions are filed, the FAS decides whether to 
approve or deny the petitions based on the eligibility criteria. In this study, I focus only on the 
petition-filing decision making by farmers. I categorize three main groups of factors that I 
expect to affect farmers’ petition filing behavior: Eligibility criteria, access to information, and 
motivation. 
 
1. Eligibility Criteria 
 
In order for a group of farmers who has filed a TAA petition to be eligible for the cash 
benefits, they should meet the following criteria: (i) the price of the commodity in a given 
marketing year should be less than 80% of the national average price in the 5 preceding 
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marketing years. (ii) There needs to be an increase in imports of like or directly competitive 
products
9
 during the most recent 12 months period, and (iii) the increase in imports has 
demonstrably contributed to the price decline
10
. Once judged eligible by the FAS, cash 
payment will be made to the producers if: (iv) farmers’ net farm income11 for the most recent 
year is less than that of the latest year, and (v) the farmers have met with Extension officers 
and receive technical assistance. Hereafter, I call the criteria (i), (ii), and (iv) “the price 
criterion,” “the import criterion,” and “the income criterion” respectively12. Since these 
eligibility criteria are to be verified by the USDA for approval, I expect that farmers are more 
likely to file a petition for the commodities that meet the aforementioned three eligibility 
criteria.   
H1: Chances of petition filing will increase if the commodity and producers in 
consideration meet the (a) price, (b) import, and/or (c) income criteria. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 According to Sec. 1580.102 of the 7 C.F.R. (Code of Federal Regulations), “like or directly 
competitive generally means products falling under the same HTS number used to identify the 
agricultural commodity in the petition. A “like” product means substantially identical in inherent or 
intrinsic characteristics, and the term “directly competitive” means those articles which are substantially 
equivalent for commercial purposes, that is, are adapted to the same uses and are essentially 
interchangeable therefore.” 
10
 According Section 291 of the Trade Act of 2002 - 107 P.L. 210, “contributed importantly means a 
cause which is important, but not necessarily more important than any other cause,” and is determined 
by the Secretary of Agriculture.  
 
11
 According to the USDA’s website, net farm income is “a value of production measure, indicating the 
farm operators' share of the net value added to the national economy within a calendar year, 
independent of whether it is received in cash or a noncash form such as increases/decreases in 
inventories and imputed rental for the farm operator's dwelling.” It is also a “portion of the net value 
added by agriculture to the national economy earned by farm operators (i.e., the entrepreneurial 
earnings of those individuals who share in the risks of production and materially participate in the 
operation of the business).” Source:http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmincome/glossary/def_nfi.htm 
 
12
 Since it is not easy both for the potential participants (producers) to address the causality between the 
surge in imports and decline in prices in the petition-filing stage and for me to come up with a measure 
for such causality, I do not include the criterion (iii) in the analysis. Also, criterion (v) is not included in 
the analysis because it is what farmers will have to fulfill in order to receive cash benefit once eligible 
for the benefit, not something which is determined prior to filing the petition. 
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2. Access to Information 
 
Farmers may simply not know about the existence of the TAA program, or may not have 
an access to relevant information – such as administrative processes for petition-filing and/or 
related price and import data – which would potentially decrease farmers’ participation. 
According to a study about the TAA for Workers program by the Schiller et al. (2009), many 
potentially eligible workers do not know if the program exists or how to petition for 
certification, which deters program participation. Brock et al. (2002) points out that simply not 
knowing about programs themselves or their benefits deterred participation to welfare-to-work 
programs during 1992-94, citing a study conducted by the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-
Work Strategies. Also, Breakell (2011) argued that the lack of knowledge about the presence 
of the farmland protection programs is a potentially significant barrier to farmers’ 
participation in these programs. To capture the effect of information access, or lack thereof, I 
will examine: (i) the role of extension staff, (ii) education and age of farmers, and (iii) 
experience and know-how. 
 
2.1 Extension Staff 
I expect the farmers in states with more cooperative extension staff per farmers are likely 
to have more opportunity to gain information about the program. Feder and Slade (1984) 
considered extension as a major source of information to farmers, and used the extension 
agents’ visits to the village in which farmers reside as a measure of access to information. 
More recently, Whitacre (2008) emphasized the role of extension educators in encouraging 
broadband access and usage, thus access to information.  
H2: Chances of petition filing will increase if farmers have better access to 
information. States with more extension staffs per number of farmers will have more 
information on the TAA program and thus will file more petitions. 
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2.2 Education and age of farmers  
I focus on the role of education and age of farmers on obtaining the information on the 
TAA program, on the procedure for petitioning, and on relevant data. I expect more educated 
and younger farmers to have better access to internet, attend more workshops and seminars, 
contact more with extension officers and local government offices, etc., which might 
contribute to a better knowledge of TAA program. The evidences supporting this hypothesis 
can be found in previous studies. Jenkins et al. (2011) find that age, and education affect 
cotton farmers’ decisions to select and search for precision farming information. Younger, 
well-educated cotton farmers use more extension services, media, and private sources to 
obtain farming information. Mittal and Mehar (2012) suggests that education level plays 
crucial role in farmer’s decision to use different sources of information. Education level of 
farm operator is shown to have a positive and significant impact on the farmers’ use of 
internet (Mishra and Park, 2005). A study by Whitacre (2008) also shows that education level 
is one of the factors that create major gaps in digital access and use. Shade (2002) also 
indicates that the factors such as income, education, gender, and age greatly affect the 
diffusion of digital technology and innovation.  
H3: Chances of petition filing will increase if farmers have better access to 
information on TAA. States with: (a) younger and (b) better educated farmers will 
have better access to information, and thus will file more petitions. 
 
2.3 Experience and know-how 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) studied rural farmers in India and found that farmers’ own 
experience and neighbors’ experience with new technologies improved adoption and 
profitability of high-yielding seed varieties. As individuals learn from themselves, their 
neighbors, and their peers, the concepts “learning by doing” and “learning from others” can 
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not only be applied to production, but also to TAA petition behaviors. When farmers are 
considering a petition, previous cases of approval on the same or similar commodity in 
consideration will not only provide a useful benchmark but also reduce costs associated with 
getting necessary information and farmers’ perceived risk of denial. Know-how and 
experience obtained by the course of the previous cases will act as a crucial factor for petition-
filing decision. 
H4: Chances of petition filling will be higher for the commodities on which petition 
was approved before. 
 
3. Incentives 
 
Merely knowing about the program, having information on necessary procedures, and 
knowing whether the commodity meets the eligibility criteria may not be sufficient for farmers 
to actually file a petition considering the opportunity cost of filing the petitions. I postulate 
that there are three types of incentives -- financial, productivity-related, and risk-related -- for 
the TAA benefits that can actually motivate farmers to file a petition.   
 
3.1 Financial incentives  
Financial incentives are factors related to expected monetary gain from filing a petition 
and receiving a cash payment after being proved eligible. A crucial point about the TAA cash 
benefit is the existence of cash payment cap of $10,000 per year. Hence, for farmers 
producing and selling certain commodities at a very large scale, the marginal benefit from 
filing a petition and receiving not more than a $10,000 of cash payment may be very small or 
nonexistent compared to the large amount of revenue received by selling the commodity, and 
therefore there will be less petitions filed related to those commodities. Therefore I expect that 
average farm size has a negative effect on the petition filing. 
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Tenure of farmers may affect the farmers’ financial incentives as well. I expect full owner, 
as opposed to part owner and tenant owner, are likely to have more direct monetary interests, 
and thus have higher motivation for filing petitions. Several previous studies of land tenure 
and investment can be a rationale for this idea. Smith (2004) finds a positive relationship 
between documentation of land title and fixed investments in Zambia. Graham and Darroch 
(2001) show that more security of tenure is related to higher demand for credit for agricultural 
investment financing. Other studies done by Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003), and Place and 
Otsuka (2002) also find evidence that tenure of farmers is positively related to incentives for 
investments.  
Also, farmers with farming as their primary occupation are expected to have higher 
financial incentives. Previous researchers have examined the relationship between farming as 
a primary occupation and farmers’ motivations to improve efficiency, to invest, etc. Lambert 
et al. (2006) find that farm operators whose primary occupation is farming are more likely to 
adopt practices that require extra time and expense than farm operators who focus on nonfarm 
occupations. Kibet et al. (2011) studied farmers in Kenya and show that farming as main 
occupation as one of the factors that significantly increases the adoption of high yielding and 
high value crops. In the context of TAA, states with higher percentage of farms owned by full 
owners and those with higher percentage of farmers with farming as their primary occupation 
are expected to invest more time and effort to file more TAA petitions that would possibly 
result in financial assistance. 
Lastly, receipt of other types of direct government payments, such as counter-cyclical 
payments and marketing loan benefits, may affect the marginal benefit from the TAA cash 
payment. For farmers in states that experienced an increase in the receipt of other types of 
direct government payments are expected show less cases of petitions. 
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H5: Chances of petition filing will increase if financial incentives related to cash 
benefit increase, and vice versa. Chances of petition filing will decrease (a) if the 
average farm size of a state is bigger. Chances of petition filing will increase in the 
states with (b) more farms owned by full owners and (c) more farmers with farming as 
their primary occupation, and in the states that (d) recently experienced a decrease in 
the receipts of other direct government payments. 
 
3.2 Productivity incentives 
Cash payment is not the only benefit that farmers can receive once they become eligible. 
Before TAA payments are made, farmers are expected to meet at least once with Extension 
officers to receive hand-on training. This mandatory technical assistance is not only a 
responsibility but also a privilege that farmers will take once eligible for cash benefit. For 
farmers with less education and technology, this technical assistance will act as an opportunity 
to enhance productivity and thus a motivation for filing petitions. Also, farmers in states with 
more cooperative extension specialists per farmers are expected to have more opportunity to 
gain education and information from sources other than TAA program, and hence less 
productivity incentive to file a petition. 
H6: Chances of petition filing will increase if productivity incentives are higher, and 
vice versa. States with (a) lower total factor productivity and (b) smaller percentage of 
farmers with some college or higher education are expected to have higher 
productivity incentive, and file more petitions. States with (c) more extension 
specialists per number of farmers are expected to have less productivity incentive, and 
thus file less petitions. 
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3.3 Risk-related incentive 
By compensating for the half of the difference of the 80% of the price for the 5 years 
preceding the most recent marketing year (0.8 × Pa) and the price in the most recent marketing 
year (Pr), TAA cash payment sets an effective lower bound for the commodity price. Hence, a 
farmer can reduce income volatility by participating in the TAA program and receiving the 
cash payment. I assume that farmers are risk-averse, following a number of previous studies 
that suggested the evidences— Moscardi and Janvry (1977), Binswanger (1980), Dillon and 
Scandizzo (1978) -- and expect that a risk-reducing effect of TAA payments will act as an 
incentive for farmers to file a petition. I use coefficient of variances of commodity price as a 
measure of such risk. 
H7: Chances of petition filing will increase if risk-related incentive of farmers is 
higher. Farmers will have more risk-related incentive to file a petition for a 
commodity with higher coefficient of variation of prices. 
 
<Table 2.1> Summary of the hypotheses 
Factor Hypotheses Related variables  
Eligibility 
criteria 
Price eligibility H1 (a) Eligible in 5 year price criteria (+) 
Import 
eligibility 
H1 (b) Eligible in 1-year import criteria (+),  
Eligible in 5-year import criteria (+) 
Income 
eligibility 
H1 (c) Eligible in income criteria (+) 
Access to 
information 
Extension staff H2 Number of extension staff members per 1,000 farmers 
(+),  
Number of farm advisors per 1,000 farmers (+) 
Farm 
demographics 
and 
organization 
H3 (a)-(b) 
 
Average age of farmers (-),  
Some college or upper education in rural population 
(+) 
Experience and 
know-how 
H4 
 
Year dummy 04-07 (+),  
Previously approved commodity (+) 
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<Table 2.1> Summary of the hypotheses (continued) 
Factor Hypotheses Related variables  
Incentives Financial 
incentive 
H5 (a)-(d) Farm size (-),  
Farming as primary occupation (+),  
Full owner (+),  
Change in direct government payment from previous 
year (-) 
Productivity 
incentive 
H6 (a)-(c) Total factor productivity (-), 
Some college or upper education in rural population 
(+), 
Number of farm advisors per 1,000 farmers (+) 
Risk-related 
incentive 
H7 Coefficient of variation of commodity prices (+) 
1) Hypothesized effect on TAA petitions in parentheses 
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III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
1. Data  
 
 
Data from different sources are compiled to construct the data set used for this study. The 
variable names and description is in Appendix III. 
 
Petition-related data 
Petition-related data includes both dependent variable (petition) and some independent 
variables (previously_approved, years). Petition-related data was collected from observing the 
Federal Register Notices on TAA for farmers posted on the USDA FAS (Foreign Agricultural 
Service) website
13
. The variables contain whether the petition was filed for a certain 
commodity produced in a certain state and a year, whether a filed petition for TAA is 
approved, whether a commodity had been petitioned and approved ever before, whether the 
petition is a new petition or a re-evaluation for those approved in the previous year, and 
whether the petition was filed by a single state or by multiple states. 
 
Price data 
State-level price data from 1997 to 2008 was collected for 388 field crop commodities. 
The data was obtained both from the Quick Stats
14
 database and the Agricultural Prices 
reports
15
 available at the USDA NASS (National Agricultural Statistics Service) website. 
Based on this data, I calculated average prices for 5 and 3 preceding years, and coefficient of 
variation using the 5 year price data. 
                                                 
13
 http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/fr/notices.asp 
14
 http://www.nass.usda.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Quick_Stats/index.asp 
15
 http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1002 
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Import data 
Import data for agricultural products from 1997 to 2008 was collected from the GATS 
(Global Agricultural Trade System) database
16
 in the USDA FAS. Data on both import 
quantity and import value are collected. BICO (HS-10) products grouping was used because 
the level of grouping was most comparable with the one in the commodity price data. Once all 
the import data was collected, HS-10 product code was then matched with the commodity 
categories in the price data. I collapsed import data by summing up the imports of related 
commodity categories. Then, variables on percentage changes of import quantity and value, 
and import eligibility are calculated. 
 
State farm characteristics 
Data on farm demographics and farm characteristics of each state for 1997, 2002, and 
2007 (number of farmers, average farm size, tenure of farmers, average age of farm operators, 
education of rural population, percentage of farm operators with farming as their primary 
occupation) are collected from the State Fact Sheets database
17
 available on the USDA ERS 
(Economic Research Service) website. Data on net farm income (1997-2008), government 
payments (2000-2008), total factor productivity (2000-2004), and number of extension staff 
(1997) for each state are also collected from the data sets obtain at the USDA ERS. Variable 
in income eligibility was calculated from the net farm income data. Number of farm or home 
management advisors (2000-2008) used as an alternative for the number extension staff was 
obtained from the Occupational Employment Survey (OES)
18
 from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Department of Labor. 
                                                 
16
 http://www.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx 
17
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/ 
18
 http://stat.bls.gov/oes/home.htm 
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2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
<Table 2.2> reports descriptive statistics on petition-related variables. From 2003 to 2007 
during when the first round of the TAA for Farmers program was effective, only 105 among 
13,161 observations (0.8%) satisfy all three criteria (price, import, and income criteria) for the 
TAA benefit based on our data. In 2004 there is only one observation that satisfies all three 
criteria. Moreover, there is no such observation in 2005. Looking at the last column of the 
table, we can see that 151 petitions were filed during the period 2003-2007, and among those, 
39 were approved.  
In this study, “5-year price criterion” refers to price decrease in the petition year by more 
than 20% compared to previous 5-year average price, as provided in the TAA Reform Act of 
2002. The “3-year price criterion” refers to price decrease by more than 15% compared to 
previous 3-year average, as given in the ARRA (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) 
of 2009. The number of observations that satisfy 5-year and 3-year price criterion varies from 
year to year. As expected, the number of eligible commodities increases when the more 
lenient 3-year price criterion is used.  
Due to lack of precision of the import criterion - “Increases in imports of the commodity 
or like product” - in the TAA Reform Act of 200219, I used several alternative measures. “1-
year import criterion” and “5-year import criterion” are defined as increases of import quantity 
in the petition year compared to the previous year and the previous 5-year average, 
respectively. In our data, the number of eligible observations that satisfy the 5-year import 
criterion is slightly higher each year than the number of observations that satisfy the 1-year 
import criterion, except for the year 2007. Also, using either criteria, the number of eligible 
                                                 
19
 “Imports” could mean import quantity or import value. Also, “increases” could mean increase in 
imports compared to the previous year, or to the previous 5-year average, etc. 
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observations by import criterion increases in every year, meaning that more and more 
commodities each year show increases in import quantity. 
Unlike price and import criteria, there is a huge volatility in the number of eligible 
observations by income criteria (producers’ net farm income for the most recent year is less 
than that for the latest year). This in turn creates a large variation in the number of 
commodities satisfying all three criteria. Income criterion is expected to show the largest gap 
between this collected data and the data actually used by USDA. Due to limitation of data, I 
used the average net farm income of each state in each year, not the net farm income of the 
farmers actually producing specific commodity in each state in each year. This could explain 
why there is zero commodity that satisfies all three criteria in 2005 based on the data, but the 
number of approved commodities in 2006 is not zero.   
 
<Table 2.2> Descriptive statistics: Petition-related variables 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Sum 
Observations 2,671 2,680 2,623 2,647 2,541 13,162 
Eligibility  a. Price criterion (5 yr) 161 195 146 73 116 691 
b. Price criterion (3 yr) 222 295 274 134 242 1,167 
c. Import criterion (1 yr) 1,379 1,461 1,609 1,625 2,067 8,141 
d. Import criterion (5 yr) 1,552 1,642 1,650 1,752 1,960 8,556 
e. Income criterion 768 197 16 1,457 2,114 4,552 
All three criteria (a, c, e) 14 1 0 26 64 105 
Petitions 21 23 32 39 36 151 
New petitions 21 20 32 11 28 112 
Re-petitions 9 0 9 11 16 36 
Petitions by multiple states  0 8 14 14 26 71 
Number of approvals 3 0 28 8 0 39 
 
In the [Figure 2.2] below, the top, middle, and bottom panels show the number of 
eligible commodities in price, import, and income criteria, respectively. In the first panel, we 
can find that the 3-year price criterion employed by ARRA of 2009 is easier to be met than the 
5-year price criterion by the Reform Act of 2002 in all years. In the second panel, we can see 
that the number of commodities satisfying the import criteria is increasing, based on either 
criterion. The third panel shows the number of commodities satisfying the income criterion. 
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The graph is U-shaped, and the number is 16 in 2005, meaning that the farmers’ income in the 
states producing the respective commodities tended to increase until 2005. In 2006 and in 
2007, there is a sharp increase in the number of state commodities for which farmers’ income 
have declined. 
 
[Figure 2.2] Number of commodities eligible in price, import, and income criteria 
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Looking at [Figure 2.3], it is interesting to note that the number of petitions filed 
exceeds the number of observations that actually satisfy all three criteria, except for the year 
2007. A small number of petitions filed along with even smaller number of commodities that 
satisfy all three criteria for eligibility is consistent to the claims made by a previous study by 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2006) that the eligibility criteria for TAA 
benefits are too strict. 
 
[Figure 2.3] Number of eligible observations and number of petitions filed 
 
 
 
The number of petitions and approvals counted in our data differs from the actual 
number of petitions filed and approved due to several reasons
20
. [Figure 2.4] compares the 
actual number of petitions filed and approved on field crops and number of petitions filed and 
approved counted in our data. Although the numbers differ, the shapes resemble each other. 
 
                                                 
20
 Number of petitions and approvals in our data differs from the actual number of petitions filed and 
approved, because of the three main reasons: i) Scope of analysis - In this study, only field crops are 
considered and fisheries and marine products are excluded. ii) Definition of commodities - Definition 
and scope of a certain product in the actual petition case could be different from those in our study. For 
example, if petition was filed on “black olives,” it is not quite clear whether this means “fresh olives,” 
“processing olives,” or both. In this study, I treated this kind of cases as though it means both.  iii) 
Limitation of data - Some petition cases could not be included in our analysis due to a lack of data. 
These cases include: Florida fresh longans (2004), Florida lychees (2004), Indiana snapdragon (2005) 
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 [Figure 2.4] Numbers of petitions filed (left) and approved (right) 
  
 
 
 <Table 2.3> Descriptive statistics: State-level variables 
Variable 
All (12,948 Obs.)1) 
Petitioned (151 
Obs.)2) 
Approved (39 Obs.)3) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm size (acre) 570.9 763.4 326.1 366.7 271.7 113.84 
Average age 55.65 1.42 55.57 1.46 54.74 1.43 
Some college or 
upper (%) 
44.26 7.55 45.11 8.57 45.17 8.2 
Primary 
occupation 
55.16 6.82 54.82 6.63 57.05 4.04 
Net farm income  
(million $) 
10,095 22,414 4,255 8,763 2,636 2,641 
Full owner (%) 69.65 7.66 71.63 4.63 71.65 4.44 
Individual (%) 87.29 4.12 86.34 3.98 87.04 3.84 
Change of 
government 
payment  
0.13 0.68 -0.04 0.4 0.36 0.43 
Extension staff 
ratio 
9.1 6.24 7.71 4.57 8.1 4.75 
Farm advisors ratio 7.7 7.41 8.11 7.59 7.76 6.92 
Hours worked per 
week 
39.7 3 40.39 2.77 40.62 2.83 
Total factor 
productivity 
1.21 0.29 1.29 0.32 1.32 0.29 
1) For farm advisors ratio, 9,342 obs. 
2) For farm advisors ratio, 137 obs. 
3) For farm advisors ratio, 35 obs. 
 
<Table 2.3> shows descriptive statistics for state-level variables associated with all, 
petitioned, and approved observations, respectively. Compared to all observations, on average, 
petitioned observations tend to show smaller farm size, lower average age of farm operators 
and lower percentage of farmers with farming as their primary occupation, smaller net farm 
income and percentage of individual operators, and extension staff ratio. Petitioned 
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observations show on average 4% decrease in the amount of direct government payment 
between the petition year and the year before, whereas all observations show a 13% increase. 
Compared to all cases, petitioned cases on average show higher level of education (higher 
percentage of rural population with some college or upper education), higher percentage of 
full owner, higher farm advisors ratio, more hours worked per week, and higher total factor 
productivity. <Table 2.4> below shows which of the hypotheses are supported based on 
simple comparison of means. 
 
<Table 2.4> Results from comparing the mean of state characteristics 
Factor Hypothesis
1)
 Results 
Access to 
information 
Extension staff H2: Extension staff ratio (+) Contradictory 
Demographics and 
farm organization 
H3a: Average age of farmers (-) Supported 
H3b: Some college or upper education (+) Supported 
Experience and 
know-how 
H4b: Previously approved (+) - 
Incentives Financial  H5a: Farm size (-) Supported 
H5b: Farms owned by full owners (+) Supported 
H5c: Farming as primary occupation (+) Contradictory 
H5d: % Change in government payment (-) Supported 
Productivity  H6a: Total factor productivity (-) Contradictory 
H6b: Some college or upper education (-) Contradictory 
H6c: Extension staff ratio (-) Supported 
1) Anticipated effect on petition filing decision in parentheses. 
Compared to petitioned cases, on average, approved cases show smaller farm size and 
average age, and lower farm advisors ratio. Also, approved cases show higher percentage of 
rural population with some college or upper education, higher percentage of farmers with 
farming as their primary occupation, higher net farm income, higher percentage of full owners 
and individual farm operators, higher extension staff ratio and total factor productivity, and 
more hours worked per week.  
<Table 2.5> below shows the correlation coefficients among independent variables. The 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) from ordinary-least-squares regressions have a mean value of 
2.23, ranging from 1.00 (cv) to 3.77 (primary), which are presented in <Table 2.6>. VIF is a 
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measure of severity of multicollinearity. Based on the common rule of thumb of 10 (O’brien, 
2007), I conclude that the multicollinearity among the variables are not so severe in this study. 
 
<Table 2.5> Correlation among variables (obs=10,713) 
 
  
extension
_ratio 
Avg 
age 
Some 
college 
prev~ 
approved 
Farm 
size 
primary 
full 
owner 
chg_go
vpmt 
cv 
tf
p 
extension_ratio 1                   
avg_age -0.033 1                 
somecollege 0.104 -0.052 1               
prev~approved -0.001 0.04 0.019 1             
farmsize 0.24 -0.079 0.246 -0.026 1           
primary -0.075 -0.504 0.268 -0.057 0.287 1         
full owner 0.234 0.462 -0.028 0.018 -0.077 -0.489 1       
chg_govpmt 0.115 -0.081 -0.063 -0.08 -0.009 0.093 0.004 1     
cv -0.012 0.01 0.006 0 0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.003 1   
tfp 0.058 0.192 0.238 0.03 -0.2 0.145 0.376 -0.031 0.006 1 
 
<Table 2.6> Variance Inflation Factors of variables 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
primary 3.77 0.26503 
tfp 3 0.33322 
full_owner 2.66 0.3764 
farmsize 2.32 0.43031 
somecollege 2.22 0.45046 
chg_govpmt 2.13 0.47014 
avg_age 1.89 0.52891 
previously_approved 1.06 0.94775 
cv 1 0.99678 
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IV. Empirical Strategy  
 
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use the binary logistic regression approach 
to test the hypotheses. In binary logistic regressions, the dependent variable Y has a value of 1 
with probability π and 0 with probability 1- π.  
 
where . 
X1, X2 , and X3 are the vectors of variables related to the four factors affecting the 
petition-filing decision – namely, eligibility criteria, access to information, and incentives, 
respectively.  
In our data, only 151 petitions are filed, which accounts for only about 1.1% of the 
total of 13,161 observations. Because of this large disparity between the numbers of 0s 1s in 
the dependent variable, application of the standard logit regression method may result in 
biased coefficients and underestimate rare events (King and Zeng, 2001a, 2001b), in this 
paper, petition-filing. Hence, I apply the method of relogit (rare events logistic regression), an 
unbiased estimator developed by King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) for rare events and small 
samples. Relogit estimates the same model as a traditional logit regression but corrects for 
possible coefficient biases by producing lower mean square error in case of rare events (King 
and Zeng, 2001b). 
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V. Hypothesis Tests 
 
I run relogit models to test the impact of the three groups of factors – eligibility criteria, 
access to information, and incentives– on farmers’ petition filing behavior. <Table 2.7> 
reports the relogit results with binary variable “petition” (petition =1, non-petition =0) as a 
dependent variable. I start from Model 1 and successively augment the model until Model 6. I 
do so to see the robustness of the results (i) when adding the time-related variables such as 
year dummies, and (ii) when alternative variables are used to test certain hypotheses. Model 1 
in column (1) shows the relogit result without any time-related variables included. Model 2 in 
column (2) augments the Model 1 by including the factor “previously_approved.” Model 3 in 
column (3) includes both the variable “previously_approved” and the year dummies. Let us 
call the Model 3 our “main model.” Model 4 through Model 6 in columns (4) to (6) modifies 
the main model by using various alternative measures. Model uses the total factor productivity 
(“tfp”) instead of some college or upper education (“somecollege”) as a measure of 
productivity and opportunity cost for filing a petition. Model 5 uses 5-year import criterion 
instead of 1-year import criterion by using the variable “eligible_import5” instead of 
“eligible_import.” Model 6 uses the variable “farm_advisor_ratio” instead of “extension 
_ratio.”  
 
1. Eligibility Criteria 
 
Eligibility criteria show either insignificant or contradictory results. Price eligibility 
(eligible_price5) is shown to have a positive effect on petition filing as expected, but is 
insignificant, in all six models. Import eligibility (eligible_import) is showing a negative and 
significant coefficient in Models 1 through 3, meaning that satisfying the import eligibility 
criterion lowers the chances that the commodity is petitioned. However, the levels of 
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significance decreases as more time-related variables are added in the model. Moreover, the 
sign of the coefficient flips to positive when 5-year import criterion is used in Model 5. 
Income eligibility (eligible_income) is shown to be insignificant in all models except for 
Model 2, where the variable was negative and significant, contrary to our expectation. Also, 
the signs flip from negative to positive according to different specifications. Hence, it is hard 
to find an evidence to support hypotheses from H1a to H1c. These counter-intuitive or 
insignificant results on eligibility criteria imply the following: First, farmers do not tend to 
respond well to the import surge or decline in price and income by filing TAA petitions. Also, 
some factors other than eligibility criteria may be more significant in determining TAA 
participation. Second, the results show a high sensitivity to different criteria used, which 
means that a lack of clearly-defined criteria can be a loophole in the policy. For example, 
when we use the 5-year import criterion in Model 5 instead of 1-year criterion, the sign on the 
import criterion flips from negative to positive. The Reform Act of 2002 sets out that the 
“increases in imports like or directly competitive commodity…contributed importantly to the 
decline in price” as one of the eligibility criteria, but it does not specify how the “increases in 
imports” is measured – whether the value or quantity of imports is used, and the reference 
point to measure the “increase,” etc. 
 
2. Access to information 
 
2.1 Extension staff 
Ratio of the number of cooperative extension staff members to the number of farmers 
(ext_ratio) shows a negative and significant coefficient in Models 1 through 5, contradicting 
the H2 which expected that higher extension staff ratio will decrease the chances of petition 
filing. When I use the ratio of farm and home management advisors to the number of farmers 
(adv_farmers) instead (Model 6), the coefficient is still negative, although insignificant. Hence 
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hypothesis H2 is not supported by our data. One possible explanation for this might be that the 
states with larger number of extension staff members to the number of farmers already enjoy 
other types of government support programs and are better equipped with new information 
and technology such that the financial assistance and technical training from the TAA program 
is not adding much of values. It may also be due to the data. The most recent data of the 
extension staff members was as of 1997. Therefore, the time frame of the variables does not 
exactly match, and there might have been some change in the number since 1997.  
 
2.2 Demographics and farm organization 
The coefficient on average age of farm operators is negative and significant in all six 
models, supporting H3a which proposed that states with younger farmers with better access to 
information are more likely to file more petitions. Some college or upper education has a 
positive and significant impact on petition filing only in Model 1, and positive and 
insignificant impact in other models. In Model 4, education factor is not included. Hence, the 
hypothesis H3b is supported only on Model 1.  
 
2.3 Experience and know-how 
Previous cases of approval (previously_approved) have a positive and highly significant 
impact on the petition-filing in all specifications, as predicted in H4. Therefore, the experience 
and know-how accumulated from previous approval of the same state commodity does seem 
to raise the possibility of filing petitions on the same state commodity. 
 
3. Incentives 
 
3.1 Financial incentive 
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“Farmsize” shows negative impacts on petition as expected in H5a, but the impacts are 
insignificant in all specifications except for Model 4. “Full_owner” shows positive and highly 
significant impacts on petition filing in all specifications, which means that chances of petition 
filing increased in the states with more farms owned by full owners. Hence, the hypothesis H5b 
is supported. “Primary” shows positive and significant coefficients in Models 2-6, and positive 
and insignificant in Model 1. Hence, H5c is supported. “Chg_govpmt” showed negative effects 
in all six models with 1% level of significance, except for in Model 2 where the coefficient 
was not significant. Hence, hypothesis H5d is supported, suggesting that the chances of petition 
filing increases in the states that experienced recent decreases in direct government payments. 
 
3.2 Productivity incentive 
“Tfp” showed a negative and insignificant impact on petition filing. Hence, there is not 
enough evidence to support the hypothesis H6a. “somecollege” was positive and insignificant 
in Models 2, 3, 5, and 6, thus failing to support both H3b and H6b. However, the hypothesis H6c 
is supported, based on the negative and significant impact of extension staff ratio in Models 1-
5. When the farm advisor ratio is used in Model 6 instead of the extension staff ratio, the 
coefficient was negative and insignificant. Note that the hypotheses H2 and H6c cannot be 
supported simultaneously from the outset, since they expect the opposite effects of extension 
staff ratio on petition filing decision. Based on our results, we can infer that the impact of 
higher extension staff ratio is generally negative, with lower productivity incentives created 
from the higher extension staff ratio outweighing its positive impact on access to information. 
 
3.3 Risk-related incentive 
“Cv” showed positive effect on the petition-filing decision in all specifications, significant 
in 1% level in Models 2-6, and in 5% level in Model 1. Therefore, the hypothesis H7 that 
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expected higher variances of commodity prices to increase risk-related incentives of farmers 
and thus increase the chances of petition filing is supported. 
<Table 2.7> Relogit results
1), 2)
 
Variables (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
eligible_price5 0.130   0.437   0.338   0.416   0.308   0.488   
  (0.368)   (0.409)   (0.411)   (0.421)   (0.407)   (0.424)   
eligible_import -0.738 *** -0.394 ** -0.321 * -0.311      -0.216   
  (0.190)   (0.180)  (0.187)   (0.189)      (0.195)   
eligible_import5                 0.216       
                  (0.240)       
eligible_income 0.078   -0.543 *** -0.178   0.032  -0.147   0.123   
  (0.193)   (0.201)  (0.241)   (0.241)  (0.241)   (0.252)   
extension_ratio -0.053 ** -0.058 ** -0.047 ** -0.051 *** -0.047 **     
  0.022   (0.021)   (0.020)   (0.019)   (0.020)       
farm_advisor_ratio     
  
    
  
    -0.009   
                      (0.014)   
avg_age -0.165 ** -0.159 * -0.246 *** -0.201 ** -0.246 *** -0.255 *** 
  (0.082)   (0.089)  (0.091)   (0.087)  (0.092)   (0.085)   
somecollege 0.027 ** 0.014   0.0003       0.00007   0.003   
  (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.012)       (0.012)   (0.018)   
tfp     
  
    -0.255       
  
      
  
    (0.465)       
  
primary 0.067   0.039 ** 0.074 *** 0.069 *** 0.072 *** 0.060 ** 
  (0.020)   (0.019)   (0.023)   (0.026)   (0.023)   (0.027)   
farmsize -0.001   -0.001  -0.001   -0.001 * -0.001   -0.001   
  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)   
full_owner 0.052 *** 0.060 *** 0.084 *** 0.073 *** 0.083 *** 0.071 *** 
  (0.015)   (0.017)   (0.018)   (0.017)   (0.018)   (0.023)   
chg_govpmt -0.698 *** -0.141  -1.984 *** -1.879 *** -1.980 *** -1.707 *** 
  (0.192)   (0.143)  (0.396)   (0.383)  (0.400)   (0.365)   
cv 0.239 ** 0.241 *** 0.275 *** 0.279 *** 0.281 *** 0.305 *** 
  (0.079)   (0.073)   (0.070)   (0.071)   (0.072)   (0.091)   
previously_approved     3.923 *** 4.523 *** 4.558 *** 4.574 ** 4.472 *** 
      (0.224)  (0.359)   (0.352)  (0.315)   (0.363)   
yr04         -0.712 * -0.502   -0.734 * -0.487   
          (0.383)   (0.392)   (0.387)   (0.397)   
yr05     
  
1.515 *** 1.635 *** 1.466 *** 1.551 *** 
      
  
(0.395)   (0.417)  (0.395)   (0.418)   
yr06         -1.855 *** -1.675 *** -1.989 *** -1.720 *** 
          (0.461)   (0.459)   (0.456)   (0.457)   
yr07     
  
-0.800   -0.833  -0.910 * -0.961 * 
      
  
(0.513)   (0.511)  (0.524)   (0.527)   
cons 0.752   -1.965   -0.118   -1.348   -0.235   1.487   
  (4.648)   (4.773)   (4.374)   (4.915)   (4.435)   (4.148)   
Obs. 12,131   12,137   12,137   10,179   12,137   8,881   
1) *, **, ***: significant in 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
2) Relogit is not a maximum likelihood estimator. Therefore, relogit does not provide log 
likelihood or pseudo R
2
. 
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VI. Robustness Tests 
 
1. Controlling for Commodity Fixed Effects 
 
For robustness check, I first control for the commodity fixed effects to account for the 
variations within the groups of different commodities. That way, I try to mitigate the 
unobserved heterogeneity among commodities that are constant among time, and potential 
correlation of commodities and independent variables. I use the “xtlogit” command in STATA 
to estimate commodity fixed-effects logistic regression models. Columns (1) - (6) in <Table 
2.8> show the results from the fixed-effects logistic regression using the identical variables 
used in each model in the relogit analysis. All six models are highly significant, and results are 
mostly consistent with those from the relogit analysis. Note that, in each model, number of 
observations in xtlogit analysis shrinks down to about 10% of relogit analysis, because 
STATA automatically drops a number of groups based on all positive or all negative results. 
Let us focus only some noticeable differences between the two sets of results. First, there 
are some discrepancies in the results on the eligibility criteria. In xtlogit, coefficients on price 
eligibility are showing negative signs, although none of them is significant. The signs are all 
positive in relogit analysis, although all insignificant. This is mainly due to the large standard 
errors involved. Also, import eligibility which consistently showed negative signs in all 
specifications in relogit becomes insignificant in xtlogit analysis except for Model 1. Second, 
except for price eligibility and “primary,” xtlogit results mostly preserves the signs of the 
coefficients in the relogit analysis, although the level of significance varies. Variable 
“somecollege” preserves positive sign and becomes highly significant in all specifications in 
xtlogit analysis, whereas in relogit the variable was significant only in Model 1. “Farmsize” 
also preserves negative sign, but becomes significant in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 5 in xtlogit 
analysis. “Extension_ratio” and “cv” both preserve their signs in xtlogit. However, they lose 
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significance in Models 3-6 of xtlogit analysis. “Primary” shows the most notable differences 
in two analyses. It was positive and significant in Models 2-6 of relogit analysis. However, the 
variable becomes negative and significant in Models 1 and 6 in xtlogit. One possible 
explanation for this inconsistency is the relatively high correlation with other independent 
variables and the high VIF that the variable “Primary” shows.21 Possible multicollinearity 
problem might have caused the flipping signs of the coefficient. 
<Table 2.8> Xtlogit results
1)
 
Variables (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
eligible_price5 -0.381 
 
-0.123 
 
-0.315 
 
-0.363 
 
-0.350 
 
-0.199 
 
 
(0.399) 
 
(0.401) 
 
(0.419) 
 
(0.426) 
 
(0.421) 
 
(0.435) 
 
eligible_import -0.672 *** -0.305 
 
-0.286 
 
-0.308 
   
-0.237 
 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.233) 
 
(0.241) 
 
(0.256) 
   
(0.259) 
 
eligible_import5 
        
-0.617 * 
  
         
(0.332) 
   
eligible_income -0.232 
 
-0.669 ** -0.505 * -0.327 
 
-0.518 * -0.240 
 
 
(0.239) 
 
(0.266) 
 
(0.296) 
 
(0.302) 
 
(0.299) 
 
(0.304) 
 
extension_ratio -0.034 * -0.040 * -0.032 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.030 
   
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.022) 
   
farm_adv~_ratio 
          
0.017 
 
           
(0.017) 
 
avg_age -0.362 *** -0.366 *** -0.449 *** -0.408 *** -0.443 *** -0.631 *** 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.129) 
 
somecollege 0.065 *** 0.064 *** 0.057 *** 
  
0.056 *** 0.075 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
   
(0.019) 
 
(0.023) 
 
tfp 
      
-0.235 
     
       
(0.635) 
     
primary -0.043 * -0.022 
 
0.009 
 
0.002 
 
0.011 
 
-0.084 ** 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.038) 
 
farmsize -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 ** -0.0003 
 
-0.001 * -0.0001 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
full_owner 0.038 
 
0.043 * 0.064 ** 0.031 
 
0.065 ** 0.002 
 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.027) 
 
chg_govpmt -0.506 ** -0.281 
 
-2.283 *** -2.088 *** -2.269 *** -1.793 *** 
 
(0.229) 
 
(0.217) 
 
(0.551) 
 
(0.546) 
 
(0.551) 
 
(0.523) 
 
cv 0.830 ** 0.736 ** 0.572 
 
0.556 
 
0.549 
 
0.575 
 
 
(0.376) 
 
(0.372) 
 
(0.370) 
 
(0.372) 
 
(0.371) 
 
(0.386) 
 
prev~_approved 
  
1.607 *** 2.231 *** 2.287 *** 2.420 *** 2.316 *** 
   
(0.329) 
 
(0.454) 
 
(0.470) 
 
(0.434) 
 
(0.495) 
 
yr04 
    
-1.189 ** -0.943 * -1.173 ** -0.733 
 
     
(0.489) 
 
(0.495) 
 
(0.490) 
 
(0.487) 
 
yr05 
    
1.408 *** 1.541 *** 1.362 *** 1.492 *** 
     
(0.428) 
 
(0.453) 
 
(0.425) 
 
(0.454) 
 
yr06 
    
-1.732 *** -1.498 *** -1.878 *** -1.421 ** 
     
(0.565) 
 
(0.571) 
 
(0.568) 
 
(0.582) 
 
yr07 
    
-0.812 
 
-0.785 
 
-0.893 
 
-1.384 * 
     
(0.691) 
 
(0.705) 
 
(0.688) 
 
(0.721) 
 
Log likelihood -340.70 
 
-328.06 
 
-313.92 
 
-288.26 
 
-312.91 
 
-259.25 
 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
Obs. 1812 
 
1812 
 
1812 
 
1621 
 
1812 
 
1322 
 
1) *, **, ***: significant in 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
                                                 
21
 “Primary” had a VIF of 3.77, and it is the second highest among the variables. “Indiv” had VIF of 
5.02, and it was dropped based on the concern of multicollinearity. 
41 
2. Using Only the Eligible Commodities  
 
Next results show the robustness check using only the commodities that satisfy the 
five-year price eligibility. Note that the number of observations shrinks down to 657, only 
about 5% of that of the original data. Among 657 observations, petitions were filed for only 9 
observations, which accounts for only 1.3%. Here the squared average age of farmers 
(ave_age_squared) is also included to consider the nonlinear effects of age and standard 
ordinary least squres (OLS) method is used. Columns (1) through (6) in <Table 2.9> shows 
the results. Variables are mostly insignificant possibly due to the shrinkage of observations 
and also due to highly disproportionate dependent variable. However, “primary” is positive 
and highly significant in Models 1-6, and “farmsize” is negative and significant in Models 1-5, 
supporting the original relogit results. Besides, the year dummies for 2004 and 2006 are 
negative and significant. Although insignificant, the sign on the farmers’ age is preserved to 
be negative. The sign on the squared average age is positive. Therefore, state commodities 
with younger farmers tend to show more cases of petition. However, the effect becomes less 
pronounced as the average age of farmers decreases further. 
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<Table 2.9> OLS results with only the eligible (5-year price criteria) commodities
1) 
Variables (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
extension_ratio 
  
0.001   0.0010   0.0012   0.0011   0.0012       
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)       
farm_adv~ratio  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.0015   
                    (0.001)   
avg_age 
  
-0.3011   -0.3064   -0.2795   -0.2873   -0.2795   -0.3802   
(0.239) 
 
(0.240)   (0.273)   (0.322)   (0.273)   (0.464)   
ave_age_sq. 
0.0027   0.0027   0.0024   0.0025   0.0024   0.0033   
(0.002) 
 
(0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.004)   
somecollege 
0.0001   0.0001   -0.0001       -0.0001   -0.0020   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)   (0.000)       (0.000)   (0.001)   
tfp 
            0.0184   
 
  
 
  
  
 
    
 
  (0.031)           
primary 
0.0027 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0020 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0051 ** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
farmsize 
-0.0001 ** 0.0001 ** -0.0001 ** -0.0001 ** -0.0001 ** -0.0001   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
full_owner 
0.0009 
 
0.0010   0.0012   0.0005   0.0012   0.0034 * 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
chg_govpmt 
0.0038 
 
0.0037   -0.0148   -0.0139   -0.0148   -0.0031   
(0.007)   (0.007)   (0.010)   (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.016)   
cv 
-0.0003 
 
-0.0003   -0.0001   -0.0002   -0.0001   -0.0031   
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.005)   
prev~approved  
  -0.0133   -0.0120   -0.0158   -0.0120   -0.0189   
    (0.044)   (0.044)   (0.053)   (0.044)   (0.062)   
yr04  
  
 
  -0.0329 ** -0.0371 ** -0.0329 ** -0.0426 * 
 
  
 
  (0.014)   (0.016)   (0.014)   (0.022)   
yr05 
        0.0064   0.0057   0.0064   -0.0013   
        (0.014)   (0.017)   (0.014)   (0.025)   
yr06  
  
 
  -0.0394 ** -0.0456 ** -0.0394 ** -0.0565 * 
 
  
 
  (0.018)   (0.022)   (0.014)   (0.031)   
yr07 
        -0.0145   -0.0276   -0.0145   0.0083   
        (0.024)   (0.029)   (0.024)   (0.044)   
cons 
8.1899   8.3366   7.6248   7.9395   7.6248   10.5283   
(6.680)   (6.702)   (7.626)   (9.005)   (7.626)   (12.94)   
Prob > F 
0.0824 
  
0.1181 
  
0.0511 
  
0.0967 
  
0.0511 
  
0.1120 
  
R squared 
0.0233 
  
0.0234 
  
0.0358 
  
0.0384 
  
0.0358 
  
0.0506 
  
Adj. R 
squared 0.0097 
  
0.0083 
  
0.0147 
  
0.0132 
  
0.0147 
  
0.0166 
  
Obs. 657   657   657   551   657   
406 
  
1) *, **, ***: significant in 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
<Table 2.10> below summarizes the results from the main model (Model 3) in the original 
relogit analysis and robustness checks using xtlogit and OLS (eligible only) analyses. 
Hypotheses H3b and H5a that failed to be supported in relogit analysis due to insignificance are 
supported in xtlogit analysis, whereas hypotheses H5c and H6c that are supported in relogit 
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failed to be supported in xtlogit analysis and the OLS using the eligible cases. Hypothesis H5c 
that were supported in relogit but was insignificant in xtlogit was also supported in the OLS. 
 
<Table 2.10> Comparison of relogit and xtlogit results in the main model (Model 3) 
Factor Hypothesis1) Relogit  Xtlogit Eligible 
(OLS) 
Eligibility 
criteria 
Price eligibility H1a: Price eligibility (+) Insignificant Insignificant - 
Import 
eligibility 
H1b: Import eligibility (+) Contradictory Insignificant - 
Income 
eligibility 
H1c: Income eligibility (+) Insignificant Contradictory - 
Access to 
information 
Extension staff H2: Extension staff ratio (+) Contradictory Insignificant Insignificant 
Demographics 
and farm 
organization 
H3a: Average age of farmers 
(-) 
Supported Supported Insignificant 
H3b: Some college or upper 
education (+) 
Insignificant Supported Supported 
Experience and 
know-how 
H4b: Previously approved (+) Supported Supported Insignificant 
Incentives Financial  H5a: Farm size (-) Insignificant Supported Supported 
H5b: Farms owned by full 
owners (+) 
Supported Supported Insignificant 
H5c: Farming as primary 
occupation (+) 
Supported Insignificant Supported 
H5d: % Change in 
government payment (-) 
Supported Supported Insignificant 
Productivity  H6a: Total factor productivity 
(-) 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
H6b: Some college or upper 
education (-) 
Insignificant Contradictory Insignificant 
H6c: Extension staff ratio (-) Supported Insignificant Insignificant 
Risk-related  H7: Coefficient of variance 
of prices (+) 
Supported Insignificant Insignificant 
1) Anticipated effect on petition filing decision in parentheses. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
This study questions the reasons why farmers’ participation in the TAA program has been 
meager. I examined the factors affecting farmers’ participation in the TAA program taking 
three groups of factors into account – eligibility criteria, access to information, and incentives. 
To do that, petition data from year 2003 to 2007, and price and import data from 1997 to 2008 
was collected. Data on state farm characteristics is collected for different time frame for 
different variables. Considering the large disparity of 0s and 1s in the dependent variable, 
“rare events logistic” estimator (“relogit” command in STATA) developed by King and Zeng 
(2001a, 2001b) was used instead of traditional logit model. Robustness of the result was 
checked by (i) using the fixed effect logistic regression (using “xtlogit” command in STATA) 
that takes commodity fixed effect into account, and (ii) using only the commodities that satisfy 
price eligibility. 
The results are mostly consistent in xtlogit analysis. First, in both relogit and xtlogit 
analyses, price, import, and income eligibility criteria are either insignificant to the petition-
filing decision making or are showing signs contradictory to our expectation. Possible 
explanations are as follows: (i) Farmers may not be responding well to the decline in prices 
and income, and surges in import by participating in the TAA program. Lack of information 
and data related to the program, and cost in terms of time and efforts to file a petition might be 
a reason. (ii) It may be simply due to the extremely strict eligibility criteria-- only a handful of 
observations actually meet the criteria and thus it is hard to explain the petition-filing behavior 
of farmers with those extremely small number of observations. This point adds to the 
argument that the TAA eligibility criteria have been too strict (United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), 2006), and in this context, revisions in ARRA (American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) that made group eligibility requirements more 
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lenient is expected to increase not only farmers’ participation in the program but also the role 
of eligibility criteria as a factor of petition-filing decision making.  
Second, access to information significantly affects the petition-filing behaviors. I 
considered the role of education and technology such as internet as factors affecting the access 
to information. States with better educated and younger rural population filed more petitions 
as expected. Also, know-how acquired by observing the previous cases of approval of similar 
commodity also significantly increases the chances of petition filing. Hence, helping farmers 
acquiring information on the TAA program itself, administrative procedures, or related data 
may increase the participation in the program. I also examined the role of extension staff in 
providing necessary information to farmers. However, the results were either contradictory or 
insignificant. This might be due to the mismatch of time period of data. Another possibility is 
that the states with higher extension staff ratio may already be enjoying the benefits from other 
types of government support programs, which may make participation in the TAA program 
unnecessary. 
Third, incentives are also shown to be a significant factor in the decision making. States 
with smaller farm size, states with higher percentage of farms owned by full owners, states 
with higher percentage of farmers with farming as their primary occupations, and states that 
experienced a recent decrease in direct government payments file more petitions. Also, risk-
related incentives are shown to be significant in the relogit analysis, with coefficient of 
variances of prices showing positive and significant impact on petition filing decision. This 
implies that policy makers may increase farmers’ participation in the program by increasing 
the remuneration and risk-reducing effect expected from the program. Thus, adjustment made 
by ARRA of 2009 in the cash payment cap from $10,000 to $12,000 is expected to increase 
farmers’ incentive and participation in the program. Productivity incentive, hypothesized to be 
less for states with higher extension staff ratio, is also shown to have an effect on petition 
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filing behavior. Hence, in order to increase program participation, policymakers need to better 
incentivize farmers to actually participate –for example, providing more information to 
farmers with farming as their primary occupation, to farmers whose crops are subject to higher 
price volatility, and to those in more dire need of technical assistance may increase program 
participation. 
Some limitations remain. First, although I used price data from USDA ERS expecting that 
the FAS is using the same data, there are still some discrepancies between the eligibility 
results from FAS and results from my data. Also, actual data farmers use when filing a 
petition may be different from what I used in the study. Second, the time period of data differ 
among variables. For example, some data such as the price, import, income, and petition data 
are collected in yearly basis. However, some farm characteristics such as farm size or average 
age of farmers were available only in 5-year terms. Also, there may be a gap between calendar 
year and marketing year of each commodity. The price criterion uses the marketing year. 
However, the data collected on price and imports, and on other farm characteristics are based 
on calendar year. This mismatch might have affected the results. Third, there are still 
econometric concerns. Although I tried to control for possible endogeneity and 
multicollinearity problems concerning the variables, finding better instruments for factors such 
as access to information, incentives, and opportunity costs and dealing with potential 
multicollinearity problem remain as main concerns of further analysis.   
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICY IMPACT 
I. Introduction 
 
According to the Reform Act of 2002, a group of agricultural producers is eligible for 
TAA benefits – cash payment and technical training-- if: (i) the national average price of the 
commodity for the most recent marketing year is less than the 80% of the average price for the 
five preceding marketing years, and if (ii) increases in imports of like or directly competitive 
commodity contributed importantly to the decline in prices. Once producers are approved to 
be eligible by the USDA, the amount of cash adjustment assistance given to the producers 
follows the formula for a payment related to the amount of production. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (abbreviated ARRA, Pub. L. 111-5) under the 
Obama administration amended the Reform Act. The ARRA appropriated $90 million per 
year of funding in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and $22.5 million for the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2011. It also revised the eligibility criteria. A group of producers is eligible for TAA 
benefits if (i) the national average price for the most recent marketing year is less than 85% of 
the average price for the  three preceding years, and if (ii) the volume or the value of imports 
has increased and has caused the decline in prices. Producers, once proven eligible, are paid 
lump sum cash payments that do not follow the formula. The Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Extension Act of 2011 (TAAEA) reauthorized the program until the fiscal year 2014. 
However, since the Act did not appropriate any funding, the USDA can only continue to 
provide funding for the certified commodities under ARRA of 2009 and cannot accept 
additional petitions for certification. 
In this paper, I examine the impact of the TAA program. How do different TAA regimes 
affect optimal output, producer prices, and welfare of farmers? For example, how differently 
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do the “coupled” TAA regime under the Reform Act of 2002 and the new “decoupled” TAA 
regime under the ARRA of 2009 distort prices and output? What if they amended the 
eligibility criteria?   
These questions are important given the recent preferences of policy makers towards the 
decoupled government support programs. The point of going from coupling to decoupling is 
to sever the linkage between the level of production and the amount of support. That way, 
production distortion that might cause inefficiency is mitigated. However, even with the 
decoupled program, if the optimal production decision is affected, we cannot say that the 
whole purpose of decoupling-- mitigating production distortion and promoting efficiency-- is 
served. Also, the decoupled program still might affect the producer prices and the welfare of 
farmers. Delving upon this question might help design a better TAA program in the future, a 
program that better helps farmers to adjust to import competitions, promotes their welfare, and 
minimizes potential inefficiency that can result from government supports.  
As an introductory step, basics of the TAA programs of first and second rounds and their 
impact on producer prices are discussed. Next, using a model where producers maximize 
expected utility from profit, a comparative statics analysis is done to figure out the impacts of 
the TAA programs on (i) the mean of producer prices, (ii) spread of producer prices, (iii) 
optimal output, and (iv) welfare of farmers. We take an extensive approach that allows a 
discussion of both rounds of TAA programs, and their possible modifications by simple 
change of parameters. Use of a mathematical model and an extensive approach to analyze the 
impact of TAA programs in different dimensions will be a major contribution of this chapter. 
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II. Literature Review 
This chapter is related to three streams of literature-- i) the TAA for Farmers program, iii) 
impacts of government agricultural support programs on production, and iii) decision making 
under uncertainty. 
Previous studies on the TAA were mostly on the TAA for Workers program. There has 
been a very thin literature on the TAA for Farmers program, most of which focused on the 
eligibility criteria for the program benefits. Studies have pointed out that the eligibility criteria 
for the TAA for Farmers program under the Reform Act of 2002 were too strict. According to 
Bacho et al. (2008), out of 69 complete petitions reviewed from 2002 to July 2007, 41 
petitions (59.4%) turned out to be ineligible for program benefit. The study points out the 
failure to meet the eligibility criteria (such as proving that increased import significantly 
contributed to a decline in commodity’s price and proving that price declined more than 20 
percent) as a major reason for such phenomenon, and suggests to relax the eligibility 
requirements. Another study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
(2006) also directs strict eligibility criteria as well as small amount of cash payments as 
potential factors that discourage farmers from participating in the program. It also pointed out 
that financial and technical assistance provided to producers are too limited and of short-term 
basis. A report for Congress by Jurenas (2010) provides an overview of the TAA for Farmers 
program and the program activities up to 2010. The ARRA of 2009 mandated the GAO to 
submit a report on the effectiveness of the TAA for Farmers program. As a result, a very 
recent report by GAO (2012) provides an update of the program—what commodities were 
certified and what proportion of applicants received payments after the reauthorization of the 
TAA for Farmers by the ARRA of 2009. According to the report, the USDA certified 
relatively few commodities after the reauthorization—5 out of 18 commodities -- but once the 
commodities are certified, about 90 percent of the producers who produce certified 
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commodities were approved for TAA payments. The report also argues that the USDA FAS’ 
performance measures on the TAA program do not measure long term effectiveness or 
outcomes of technical assistance. Ruan et al. (2007) focused on a particular commodity to 
address the eligibility issue. They constructed an econometric model to distinguish domestic 
from foreign impacts on the U.S. prices, and used this model to find out that the U.S. 
raspberry producers will infrequently be qualified for the benefits from the TAA. So far, no 
study has used a mathematical model to consider the impact of the TAA program. We take an 
inclusive approach that allows, by a simple change of parameters in the model, a discussion of 
the both TAA regimes and possible modifications, which will be a major difference of this 
study from other studies on the TAA. 
This chapter is also expected to contribute to the literature on the impact of agricultural 
support programs of the U.S. Government. There has been a wide discussion on the topic. The 
actual and/or potential impacts of the programs have been analyzed in many angles – impacts 
on crop decision making, on farm consumption, and on off-farm labor participation. Among 
those, this chapter is relevant the most to the potential impacts of the government farm support 
program on production. Most of the literature on the topic has recently focused on the impacts 
of “decoupled” payment programs on agricultural production.  Under the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), trade distorting effect of agricultural 
subsidies has been an issue of regular disputes. Agricultural subsidy programs classified as 
“green box” subsidies that do not have, or have minimal, trade distorting effect tend to be not 
related to -- are “decoupled” from -- current production levels and prices, or particular 
products
22
. Under Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act (1996-2002), the 
United States introduced a decoupled payment program named “Production Flexibility 
                                                 
22
 Please refer to the WTO website for more information: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm. 
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Contracts” (PFC) that pays lump-sum payments to farmers based on historical program crop 
production (Ahearn et al., 2004). Under the Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act 
of 2002 that replaced FAIR Act, PFC payments were renamed as “direct payments.” 
Hence, a number of studies have focused on the effect of these decoupled programs to see if 
they are truly “decoupled.” A stream of research has focused on producer risk and risk-related 
incentives to produce to analyze that. Chavas and Holt (1990) developed an acreage supply 
response model and found out that government price support has a cross-commodity risk-
reducing effect – that is, increase in the support price for corn will result in more acres planted 
to soybeans. Hennessy (1998) decomposed the production impacts of income support 
programs into wealth, insurance, and coupling effects, and found out that the wealth and 
insurance effects increase optimal input levels even for supposedly decoupled programs. 
Likewise, a study by Anton and Mouël (2004) on the loan deficiency programs (LDPs) and 
counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) also showed that the programs create risk-related incentives 
to produce. Young and Westcott (2000) conducted an empirical study on four of the U.S. 
agricultural support programs and found out that PFC payments have a potential to distort 
production decisions, although it depends largely on the strength of the wealth effects. 
However, Burfisher et al. (2000) analyzed the effect of direct payment program in the U.S., 
Canada, and Mexico, and concluded that the effect on production varies by country and 
commodity, and are relatively small. 
Other studies analyzed the effect of decoupled payments by directly looking at their 
impact on planted acreage. The result from these studies tend to be largely consistent: The 
effects of direct payments on acreage are modest. Adams et al. (2001) found weak empirical 
evidence that PFCs and market loss assistance (MLA) programs increase acreage, based on 
the evidence in eleven states in the U.S. between 1997 and 2000. Goodwin and Mishra (2006) 
also found a small but statistically significant effect of PFC and MLA payments on the acres 
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used for production of corn, soybeans, and wheat. Also, a recent study by Key and Roberts 
(2008) found small but statistically significant effects of decoupled payments on production, 
by studying the case of Iowa farmers in 1997 and 2002. Chau and de Gorter (2005) developed 
a theoretical model of cross-subsidization and conducted an empirical analysis. They showed 
that a removal of decoupled payments (LDPs and PFCs in their analysis) can have a large 
impact on exit decision of low-profit farms, but its impact on aggregate output can remain 
limited.  
In the context of TAA for Farmers, the TAA program before the ARRA of 2009 is 
“coupled,” or related to current production levels, because the amount of cash payment is 
proportional to production levels. On the other hand, the TAA program after the ARRA of 
2009 is “decoupled” because the amount of cash payment is unrelated to the level of 
production. By parameterizing the eligibility criteria and the cash payment formula, we can 
examine the potential impact of both coupled and decoupled TAA programs on production. 
Lastly, this chapter is also related to the theory of decision making under uncertainty. Later in 
the chapter, we analyze the potential impact of the TAA program on optimal level of 
production and welfare of producers. The discussion is based heavily on the expected utility 
hypothesis developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944-53) and on the notion of 
relative risk aversion formulated by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964). Moschini and Hennessy 
(2001) give an overview of the theory of decision making under uncertainty and static models 
under risk aversion in the context of agricultural productions. An important part of 
implications of the analyses done in this chapter depends on the magnitude of farmers’ relative 
risk aversion, especially whether the magnitude is less than unity. Relative risk aversion being 
greater than or less than unity has been used widely in propositions by authors such as Hahn 
(1970) and Rothchild and Stiglitz (1971). However, empirical studies to estimate the 
magnitude of the relative risk aversion were done later by many other authors. The estimates 
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show a very wide range: According to a survey of previous studies by Choi and Menezes 
(1985), the magnitude range from 0.05 to over 1,000. According to a more recent survey by 
Conniffe and O’Neill (2012), the estimates from previous studies range from -142 to +11. 
Choi and Menezes (1992) showed that, according to have a relative risk aversion less than one, 
the individual must be almost risk neutral. Therefore, the implication of the TAA program on 
optimal production decision in this chapter depends on the risk preferences of farmers.  
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III. Modeling the TAA Reform Act of 2002  
Let us first consider a farmer producing a single output.  is the national average price of 
the commodity in the most recent marketing year and is assumed to be a random variable with 
known distribution. Let  denote the average of the national average price of the commodity 
for the five years preceding the most recent marketing year.  is the amount of the TAA cash 
payment, which is a random variable that is determined by  and . Also,  is the amount of 
production by the producer in the most recent marketing year. Finally, let  denote the 
corresponding price of the commodity that the farmer receives based on the TAA program. 
How is  determined under the TAA Reform Act of 2002? According to the criterion 
for eligibility stated above, the TAA cash payment ( ) is made to the farmer only when  is 
below . Once producers are approved to be eligible by the USDA, the amount of cash 
adjustment assistance given to the producers is half the difference between the current price 
and the 80% of the average price for last five years, multiplied by the amount of production 
according to the formula given. Hence, there are two possible cases for the amount of the cash 
adjustment ( ) and the producer price, : 
Case 1: If  < , then the producers are eligible for TAA benefits and the TAA cash 
payment (  follows the formula: 
. 
Thus, the unit price  that a farmer actually receives under TAA program is, 
 
 
= . 
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Case 2: If , then the producers are not eligible for TAA benefits, so the amount of 
TAA cash payment is zero: 
     , and therefore, 
 
. 
From the above, when  is less than 80% of  (Case 1), the farmer receives the 
weighted-average of  and the 80% of . This way, the TAA cash payment compensates for 
the difference between the 80% of  and  The [Figure 3.1] below depicts this averaging-out 
effect of the producer price resulting from the TAA program. Without the TAA program, the 
producer price ( ) is just equal to the current price ( ). The solid line stands for the 
producer price with TAA program ( ). The kink at  shows the point where an 
eligible commodity becomes ineligible, or vice versa. We can see that, in Case 1 where the 
farmer is eligible for the TAA payment, is bounded from below by .  
 
[Figure 3.1] Producer price (  with the TAA program  
 
 
What is the implication of the discussions above in terms of returns and risk of producer 
prices? We will now show that the payoff distribution with the TAA benefit yields an 
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unambiguously higher return and bears less risk than that without the TAA payment, by 
discussing the first- and second-order stochastic dominance introduced by Hadar and Russell 
(1969).  
 
First-order stochastic dominance 
We can think of the probabilities of different realizations of the random variable  as 
payoffs of a simple lottery. Let F(p):   denote the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of the payoffs. In other words, F(p) is a probability (denoted as “Prob” below) 
ranging from 0 to 1 that the realized payoff of the lottery, or , is less than or equal to p. Let 
us also define a TAA-payment-inclusive payoff distribution of F(p), which is the CDF of 
, and denote it as G(p). The payoff distribution G(p) first-order stochastically dominates 
F(p) if we have 
G(p)  F(p) for every p in the support of G(p)  and F(p). 
Also, G(p)  F(p) for every p if and only if 
  )()()()( pdFpupdGpu  
for every non-decreasing utility function u: .
23
  
 
Proposition 1: The CDF of , G(p),  first-order stochastically dominates CDF of , F(p). 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that G(p)  F(p) for every p. 
In Case 1 (  < ),  
 =  
 
                                                 
23
 For definition of first-order stochastic dominance and the proof of this equivalence, I follow Definition 6.D.1 
and Proposition 6.D.1, respectively, in Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green, 1995, Microeconomic 
Theory, Oxford University Press, USA (June 15, 1995), p.194-195. 
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=  
                                                 . 
Since we only consider the case where , we actually look at only the p’s that are 
smaller than . Therefore,  in this case. Therefore, G(p) is F(p) shifted to 
the right by  . Hence, G(p)  F(p). 
In Case 2 ( ),  
. 
By Cases 1 and 2, G(p)  F(p) for every p, and therefore G(p) first-order stochastically 
dominates F(p).   (Q.E.D.) 
 
[Figure 3.2] Payoff distribution of  first-order-stochastically dominates that of   
 
The above proposition showed that G(p) first-order stochastically dominates F(p), i.e., 
for every non-decreasing utility u: , ,)()()()(   pdFpupdGpu the price 
distribution with TAA yields unambiguously higher returns than the price distribution without 
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TAA. Equivalently, expected utility is higher with TAA for any given non-decreasing utility 
function u. Therefore, any farmer with non-decreasing utility will prefer probability 
distribution of prices with TAA to probability distribution without TAA. 
 
Second-order stochastic dominance  
Whereas the first-order stochastic dominance is concerned with the effect of the TAA 
on the mean price, second-order stochastic dominance is about risk effects. By definition, 
when distributions G(p) and F(p) have the same mean, G(p) second-order stochastically 
dominates F(p) if and only if,  , .)()( 


xx
dppFdppG  If G(p) first-order 
stochastically dominates  F(p), i.e., when the mean of G(p) is higher than the mean of F(p), 
then G(p) second-order stochastically dominates F(p), since first-order stochastic dominance 
implies second-order stochastic dominance (Davidson, 2013). Since price distribution with 
TAA (G(p)) first-order stochastically dominates that without TAA (F(p)) as shown above, 
G(p) second-order stochastically dominates F(p).  
Proposition 2: CDF of , G(p), second-order stochastically dominates CDF of , F(p). 
Proof:  
In Case 1 (  < ),  
 =  
 
 
 
=  
                                                   . 
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Since ,   in Case 1. Therefore, G(p) is F(p) shifted to the right by  
. Hence, G(p)  F(p). 
In Case 2 ( ),  
 
By Cases 1 and 2, G(p)  F(p) for every p, and therefore G(p) first-order stochastically 
dominates F(p).    
Hence,  , .)()( 


xx
dppFdppG Therefore G(p) second-order stochastically 
dominates F(p).    
(Q.E.D.) 
Since 


xx
dppFdppG )()(  if and only if, for every non-decreasing and concave U
  ,   )()()()( pdFpupdGpu (Tesfatsion, 1976), so expected utility is larger with 
price distribution with TAA. Therefore, any risk-averse farmer will prefer probability 
distribution of prices with TAA to the probability distribution of prices without TAA.  
So far, we have learned that the price distribution with TAA first-order and second-order 
stochastically dominates the price distribution without TAA, i.e., provides higher mean prices 
and lower risk in terms of prices, and in turn, a higher expected utility. We assume that the 
cost for participation -- time and effort spent gathering information and preparing paperwork – 
is zero. Then, a reasonable prediction is that farmers will participate in the program. Hence, 
from now on, we assume that farmers will participate in the TAA program. In other words, 
farmers always apply for the TAA benefits and whenever approved eligible, they receive TAA 
cash payments. 
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IV. The Generalized Model 
 
The foregoing discussion assumes specific numbers and formula for eligibility criteria and 
cash payment. In the following, I propose a parameterized model of TAA. The objective is to 
allow a more general model that compares both the actual and the hypothesized TAA 
programs with different eligibility criteria, different amount of coupled or decoupled cash 
payments.  
 
1. Assumptions on Preferences 
Assume that the representative farmer producing only one output has a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function U:  which is strictly increasing in profits , 
strictly concave (the farmer is risk-averse), and twice continuously differentiable. Hence, 
 and . 
 
2. Definition of Variables and Parameters 
Assume that the farmer maximizes expected utility (EU) derived from profit , 
which is a random variable defined as follows: 
, 
where  is the producer price (price that the farmer actually receives) in the presence of 
the TAA program of a given commodity in a given year. q is the quantity produced by the 
farmer in that given year. is the amount of the decoupled TAA cash payment.  
We also assume a linear total cost (TC) function as follows: 
, 
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where c 0 is a unit cost of production, and  is a fixed cost. 
is a random variable that depends on  and ,  the price of the commodity in 
the most recent marketing year and the average price of the commodity for the five years 
preceding the most recent marketing year, respectively. Call the “threshold price” for 
convenience.  is a value given by the eligibility criterion. The payments are made to 
the farmer only when  decreases below the threshold price, . Hence, depending on the 
relative magnitude of the threshold price and , there are two possibilities for the coupled and 
decoupled TAA cash adjustments ( , respectively), the producer price
, and farmer’s profit : 
Case 1: If  < , then the farmer is eligible for TAA cash payment, and according to 
the cash payment formula, 
, 
where   is a multiplier given by the cash adjustment assistance formula
24
. 
Denote  as the producer price that a farmer actually receives under TAA program, or
 
. 
Cancelling-out q’s in both sides, we get, 
 
. 
Note that the producer price ( ) takes the form of a weighted-average of the price of the 
most recent marketing year ( ) and the threshold price ( .  
                                                 
24
  According to the TAA payment formula given in the TAA Reform Act of 2002, the multiplier  is 0.5 and the 
decoupled payment  is zero. According to the ARRA of 2009,  is zero and  ranges from $0 to $12,000. The 
ARRA states that “Up to $4,000 to develop a long-term business adjustment plan. If USDA approves the plan, up 
to $8,000 to implement the long-term plan,” However, the ARRA does not specify how exactly the amount of 
decoupled payment is calculated. 
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Profit of the farmers with the TAA program ( ) is production-related revenue (
) plus decoupled payment from the TAA program (D), less total production cost. 
Therefore, 
 
=   
=  . 
Case 2: If , then the farmer is not eligible for the TAA payment. Hence, 
 
 
. 
Profit of the farmers is therefore, 
 
=  . 
 
 
3. Definition of the Decision Problem 
Define the expected utility of the farmer as below: 
, 
where for  < ,  , and for ,  =  
.                 
Hence, the farmer’s decision problem is to maximize the expected utility defined as below. 
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64 
V. Analysis of the Generalized Model 
 
Based on the assumptions so far, we will examine the impact of the TAA program on the 
mean price, on the spread of prices, on the optimal output, and on the welfare of farmers via 
parameters α, β, , and D. The cumulative distribution function of  is , with a 
probability density function   
 
1. Impact on the Mean Price 
As discussed in the previous section,  when  < ,  and 
 otherwise. Hence, , the expected value of , can be written as follows. 
 
 
1.1 Impact of α on the mean price 
 
Hence, the impact of α on the mean price is positive when  . Since the range 
of price under consideration is , the impact of α on the mean price is always positive. 
Another way to see this effect is the following. We can alternatively express the expected 
value of  in terms of conditional expectation as follows. 
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From above, we can again see that  is relevant only when . In this case, larger  
means putting a higher weight on  which is larger than  when calculating . 
Therefore, bigger α increases the expected value of the producer price .  
 
1.2 Impact of β on the mean price 
 
This is positive if , which is always the case given the assumption that 
 and . The expected producer price increases as  increases, since (i) higher 
 increases the possibility that the farmer becoming eligible for the TAA benefits, and (ii) 
once eligible, other things being equal, the producer price with TAA-- the weighted-average 
price of  and  --  increases as  increases. Hence, increase in  increases the mean price.  
 
1.3 Impact of  on the mean price 
 
This is positive if , which is always the case given the assumption that  
and . Hence, increase in  increases the mean price. This is intuitive, since (i) 
higher   increases the possibility that the farmer becoming eligible for the TAA benefits, and 
(ii) once eligible, other things being equal, the producer price with TAA -- the weighted-
average price of  and  --  increases as   increases. This means that the TAA program may 
create a serial correlation of prices. For example, under the Reform Act of 2002, higher prices 
for last five marketing years ( ) will cause an increase in the mean price of this year.   
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1.4 Impact of D on the mean price 
 
Since  is the weighted-average of  and   with  as a weight, the decoupled 
payment D is irrelevant in determining the .  
 
 
2. Impact on the Spread of Prices 
Recall that, 
 
Therefore, the spread of  can be expressed as follows. 
,, 
where  
, and 
. 
 
2.1 Impact of α on the spread of prices 
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 is defined above. Note that first term is negative since it is a product of 
negative and positive terms
 25
. Note also that the second term is positive since it is a product of 
two positive terms
26
.  Therefore, the overall impact is negative. The larger the , the smaller 
the spread of prices. Once the commodity is eligible, the producer price is a weighted average 
of  and . Higher  reduces the variance of producer prices by posing a higher weight on  
 which is already a fixed number from the last five years and a lower weight on the random 
price . 
 
2.2 Impact of β on the spread of prices 
 
 
                                                 
25
  is negative, since  is smaller than  in this 
price range ( ).  
 is positive due to the following equality: 
 
26
  is positive, since  is larger than  in this price range ( ).  
We know that  is positive from the analysis of the impact of .α on the mean price. 
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Note that the first term is negative and the second term is positive. Therefore, the 
overall impact is negative. This makes sense intuitively, since higher  and the resulting 
higher threshold price increases the chances that the commodity will become eligible for TAA 
benefits. Once eligible, the random commodity price  is averaged-out with non-random , 
which decreases the spread of prices. Therefore, the price risk is reduced with higher . 
 
2.3 Impact of  on the spread of prices 
 
 
Note that the first term is negative and the second term is positive. Therefore, 
 is negative. Note also that a higher  increases the threshold price just like a 
higher  does. The intuition is the same as in the case of the impact of .  
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2.4 Impact of  on the spread of prices 
 
D affects the profit of farmers once farmers are eligible for TAA benefits. However, it 
affects neither the mean producer price nor the spread of prices.  
 
 
3. Impact on the Optimal Output 
We use the implicit function theorem to study the impact of the TAA parameters on 
farmers’ optimal production. In the previous section, we assumed that the representative 
farmer producing only one output has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U:
 which is strictly increasing in profits , strictly concave (the farmer is risk-
averse), and twice continuously differentiable. Let   and 
 denote the absolute and relative rate of risk aversion, 
respectively. 
In the previous section, we defined the farmer’s decision problem as following: 
 
The first-order condition with respect to q is 
 
Then we use the implicit function theorem to do comparative statics. First, we differentiate 
 with respect to output q to get the second-order condition,  
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which directly follows from the assumption above that the second derivative of utility function 
is always negative, i.e., the farmer is risk-averse. 
 
3.1 Impact of  on optimal output 
Proposition 3:   
If the farmer is risk-averse and  is less than one, then the optimal output  rises with . 
Proof:  
Differentiating  with respect to , 
.
27
 
where  are all positive, and  is less than one. Hence R 1 is a 
sufficient condition for >0. When >0, the optimal output q* rises with  by the 
implicit function theorem.  
 
                                                 
27
 Derivation of Proposition 3: 
 
 
(Assuming  
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 (Q.E.D.) 
Choi and Menezes (1992) give an overview of different estimates for the , the 
relative risk aversion, in a number of previous research and find that the empirical estimates of 
 range from 0.05 to more than 1,000. They also show that   being less than unity 
means that the decision maker is almost risk neutral. Given our assumption that the farmer 
actually participates in the TAA program, the impact of an increase of  on production is 
explicit – recalling the cash payment formula,28 it is clear that the bigger the , the bigger the 
extent of coupling. When the extent of coupling is bigger, it is more profitable to produce 
more. Also, we have shown that a higher  reduces the price risk the farmer faces. Hence the 
optimal production will increase with the magnitude of  if  is less than one.  
 
3.2 Impact of  on optimal output 
Proposition 4:   
If the farmer is risk-averse and  is less than one, then the optimal output  rises with . 
Proof:  
Differentiating the first-order condition  with respect to , 
,
29
 
                                                 
28
 According to the formula discussed before, the amount of cash payment is  
29
 Derivation of Proposition 4: 
 
 
(Assuming  
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where  and  are all greater than 0. Hence R 1 is a sufficient condition for 
>0. When >0, the optimal output q* rises with  by the implicit function theorem.  
 
 (Q.E.D.) 
We learned earlier in this chapter that the expected producer price increases as  
increases, since (i) a higher  increases the possibility of a farmer being eligible for the TAA 
benefits, and (ii) once eligible, other things being equal, the amount of the coupled cash 
payment – the weighted-average price of  and ,  multiplied by the production level – 
increases as  increases. As given earlier, profit of the farmer can be written as follows. 
 
Taking the expectation on both sides, we get: 
. 
Therefore, a rise in  increases  and in turn , the expected profit from 
production. Also, we have seen that higher  reduces the price risk by reducing the spread of 
prices. With higher expected profit and less price risk, a risk-averse farmer will decide to 
produce more. Therefore, higher  will increase the optimal output.  
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3.3 Impact of  on optimal output 
Proposition 5:  
If the farmer is risk-averse and  is less than one, then the optimal output  rises with . 
Proof:  
Differentiating  with respect to , 
,
30
 
where  are both greater than 0, and  is less than one. Hence R 1 is a 
sufficient condition for >0. When >0, the optimal output q* rises with  by the 
implicit function theorem.  
 
 (Q.E.D.) 
 
The intuition behind this result is very much similar to the comparative statics of β. 
With the TAA program, the expected profit of the farmer increases as  increases, since (i) 
higher  increases the possibility that the farmer becoming eligible for the TAA benefits, and 
(ii) once eligible, other things being equal, the amount of the coupled cash payment – the 
weighted-average price of  and ,  multiplied by the production level – increases as  
                                                 
30
 Derivation of Proposition 5: 
 
 
(Assuming  
 
 . 
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increases. At the same time, higher  reduces the price risk of a risk-averse farmer. A higher 
expected profit and lower risk from production will increase the expected utility from 
production, acting as an incentive to produce more. Therefore, increase in  will increase the 
optimal output. This indicates that the TAA program effectively causes a serial correlation of 
output levels, although the production decisions are independent from year to year.   
 
3.4 Impact of  on optimal output 
Proposition 6:  
The optimal output  rises with  if either (i) the threshold price ( ) is lower than the 
marginal cost, or (ii) DARA and  is less than unity.  
Proof:  
 
                                    -- (1) 
-- (2) 
From above, we know that  so 
 
only if  .     
(Q.E.D.) 
According to the proof above,  and hence , if either (i) 
 or (ii) DARA and : 
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(i)  
From the expression (1) above, , 
since we assumed that .  is the range of price being considered here, and 
 is a weighted average of   and , which should be less than . Hence, 
 is a sufficient condition for   and hence 
 Since  in this range of prices considered, the marginal revenue 
from production, which is the price , is less than the marginal cost . To maximize 
profit from production, the farmer must produce up to the point where the marginal cost 
equals the marginal revenue. In this case where the marginal cost is greater than the marginal 
revenue, the farmer should produce less since he loses profits as he produces more. However, 
a decoupled TAA payment will act as a buffer for the losses and make it profitable to produce 
more in this situation. Therefore, an increase in decoupled TAA payment will increase optimal 
output by manipulating the point where the marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Hennessy 
(1998) also pointed out that decoupled payments can reduce uncertainty on profit stemming 
from a downward price risk. By stabilizing out profit, decoupled payments reduce risk of 
farmers, and finally affect optimal production decisions. He suggested this risk-reducing effect 
of decoupled payments as a primary source of production distortion.  
 
(ii) DARA and  
From the expression (2) above, in the first term 
( ),  is the profit evaluated 
at the point where , i.e., when . Since 
, , and at any other point, 
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. Hence,  , and assuming DARA, 
. Therefore the first term is positive. Since  under the 
assumption that , the second term is negative. Therefore, the whole expression (2) 
is positive. With DARA, when a farmer receives a decoupled TAA payment, it will increase 
the farmer’s profit and thus decrease the farmer’s risk aversion. With a decreased absolute risk 
aversion, the farmer would like to produce more. This risk-reducing effect of the decoupled 
payment decreases uncertainty faced by farmers and increases production. It is called “the 
wealth effect” in Hennessy (1998).  
 
 
4. Impact on the Welfare of Producers 
In the previous section, we defined the expected utility of a producer as below. 
 
 
Using this expression, we will study the impacts of TAA parameters on producers’ welfare 
measured by expected utility. 
 
4.1 Impact of  on the welfare of producers 
 
This follows since  at the optimum. The expression above is greater than zero if 
, which is always the case in the range of prices considered. This makes sense, 
77 
because in this price range, farmers are eligible and will qualify for TAA cash benefits. Once 
qualified, greater  increases the amount of the cash benefits and hence the profits the farmer 
will receive and the price risk will decrease, which yields a higher expected utility. 
 
4.2 Impact of  on the welfare of producers 
 
The above is greater than zero if , which is always the case since we assume that
  and . We learned earlier that a higher  increases the expected producer 
price, which in turn increases expected profits of producers. At the same time, it decreases the 
price risk. Hence the expected utility of producers also increases with . 
 
4.3 Impact of  on the welfare of producers 
 
The above is greater than zero if , which is always the case since we assume that
 and  . A higher  works exactly the same way a higher  works. It 
increases expected producer price and expected profits and decreases the price risk. Hence the 
expected utility of risk-averse producers will increase. 
 
4.4 Impact of  on the welfare of producers 
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The expression above is always greater than zero. In this price range considered, a 
producer expects to receive a positive amount of decoupled payment, which increases the 
expected profit and hence expected utility of the producer. 
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VI. Discussion 
 
In this chapter, we first introduced the TAA program under the TAA Reform Act of 2002 
and the ARRA of 2009 and through the discussion on the first and second order stochastic 
dominance, showed that any producer with non-decreasing utility function would prefer 
having a price distribution with TAA to that without TAA. Then we extended the model into a 
general one to analyze the impact of the TAA parameters on the expected value of producer 
prices, spread of prices, optimal output, and welfare of farmers. The table below is a summary 
of the comparative statics. The parameters  and  come from the coupled TAA cash 
payment formula for the TAA Reform Act of 2002. D is the amount of decoupled cash 
payment for under ARRA of 2009. , the past average prices and  determine the eligibility. 
Thus, parameters , , and , and the parameters ,  and D are relevant in the discussion of 
the TAA Reform Act of 2002 and the ARRA of 2009, respectively. 
 
 <Table 3.1> Comparative statics of the generalized model 
TAA 
Parameters 
Impact on 
Mean price 
Spread of 
prices 
Optimal output 
Welfare of 
producers 
 Positive Negative Positive if R 1 Positive 
 Positive Negative Positive if R 1 Positive 
 Positive Negative Positive if R 1 Positive 
D None None 
Positive if (i)   
or if (ii) DARA and  
Positive 
 
When the coupled cash payment formula is used as in the case of the original TAA 
Reform Act of 2002, the impact of , , and  on the mean price is positive and the impact on 
the spread of prices is negative. Therefore, producers may expect that having larger  and  
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in the cash payment formula, which will result in a larger TAA cash payment, would raise the 
mean producer prices and at the same time lower the variance of prices. That way, high 
parameters can effectively lower the downside price risk of farmers. When the decoupled cash 
payment is used as in the case of ARRA of 2009, such impact on the mean and variance 
producer prices is nonexistent. In both regimes, higher  increases the chances of eligibility 
and creates a positive serial correlation of producer prices.  
The impact of the coupled and decoupled TAA parameters on optimal output depends 
on the magnitude of the relative risk aversion both in the cases of TAA Reform Act of 2002 
and the ARRA of 2009. Producers would decide to produce more with larger TAA parameters 
when the relative risk aversion is less than one. This means that, when , the TAA 
program has an output-distorting effect. When , we cannot guarantee such effect. Note 
that, when , the positive impact of  on optimal production implies that the TAA 
program may create a serial correlation of output levels. 
The impact of TAA parameters on welfare of producers is always positive under 
either regime of the TAA program. This is because the program pays out cash benefit to 
eligible farmers, which will always increase expected profit and expected utility of producers. 
 
<Table 3.2> Magnitude of the TAA parameters 
Parameters TAA Reform Act of 2002 ARRA of 2009 
 0.5 0 
 0.8 0.85 
 
Average price for last five 
marketing years 
Average price for last three 
marketing years 
D 0 Greater than or equal to 0 
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The major difference between the TAA Reform Act of 2002 and the ARRA of 2009 is 
that the former provides a TAA cash benefit following a coupled cash payment formula 
whereas the latter provides a decoupled cash payment. Another important difference is that the 
eligibility criteria of the ARRA of 2009 are easier to be satisfied. In terms of the TAA 
parameters, the differences can be summarized as shown in the following table. 
The implication on the new TAA program under the ARRA of 2009 is the following:  
First, TAA cash benefit being decoupled,  is zero, so the price and production distorting 
impact from coupling seems to be mitigated. However, we have a higher —a more lenient 
eligibility criteria – from the new TAA regime that increases the mean price and the optimal 
output when the relative risk aversion is less than one. Therefore, the magnitude of price and 
production distortion, if any, would depend on which impact is bigger—decrease in  or 
increase in . Second, since larger decoupled payment D increases expected profit of 
producers, it increases optimal output and thus could affect optimal input decisions if (i) the 
85% of the average of national average prices over last three years is less than the marginal 
cost of production, or (ii) the producers have a relative risk aversion less than one and has a 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. Especially, the first point implies that the decoupled TAA 
payment may distort the production decision by making it possible to produce at the price 
under the marginal cost, which would be unprofitable without the TAA program. Therefore, 
the TAA regime under the ARRA of 2009, which offers seemingly “decoupled” cash 
payments could still raise the mean prices and optimal output.  In that sense, USDA’s very 
recent policy change, the move of its focus from financial assistance towards technical 
training programs seems to be an appropriate measure. Lastly, the TAA program, under either 
regime, would always increase the welfare of farmers. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I. Certified/Re-certified Petitions (30 before ARRA, 10 after ARRA) 
 
Year Commodity State Certified/ 
Re-certified 
Petition 
Date 
(MM/DD/YY) 
Decision 
Date 
(MM/DD/YY) 
2003 
(7) 
 
 
Wild 
Blueberries 
Maine Certified 09/15/03 11/06/03 
Salmon Alaska Certified 09/15/03 11/06/03 
Salmon Washington Certified 09/15/03 11/06/03 
Shrimp South Carolina Certified 09/30/03 11/19/03 
Shrimp Georgia Certified 10/21/03 11/19/03 
Shrimp Texas Certified 10/21/03 11/19/03 
Catfish Multistate (Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Texas, Utah) 
Certified 10/08/03 11/25/03 
2004 
(11) 
Shrimp Alabama Certified 12/04/03 01/12/04 
Lychees Florida Certified 02/23/04 04/04/04 
Shrimp North Carolina Certified 02/23/04 04/04/04 
Shrimp Florida Certified 02/23/04 04/05/04 
Shrimp Arizona Certified 02/13/04 04/05/04 
Salmon Washington Re-certified 09/15/03 11/01/04 
Salmon Alaska Re-certified 09/15/03 11/10/04 
Shrimp South Carolina Re-certified 09/30/03 11/18/04 
Shrimp Georgia Re-certified 10/21/03 11/24/04 
Shrimp North Carolina Re-certified 02/23/04 11/30/04 
Shrimp Texas Re-certified 10/21/03 11/30/04 
2005 
(9) 
Shrimp Alabama Re-certified 12/04/03 01/10/05 
Shrimp Louisiana Certified 11/18/04 01/10/05 
Olives California Certified 01/21/05 03/14/05 
Shrimp Mississippi Certified 02/01/05 03/14/05 
Fresh Potatoes Idaho Certified 02/11/05 03/28/05 
Concord 
Grape Juice 
Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio Certified 02/25/05 03/28/05 
Shrimp Arizona Re-certified 02/13/04 04/04/05 
Lychees Florida Re-certified 02/23/04 04/04/05 
Avocados Florida Certified 11/16/05 12/29/05 
2006 
(3) 
Snapdragons Indiana Certified 12/28/05 02/10/06 
Concord 
Grape Juice 
Michigan Certified 02/21/06 03/15/06 
Concord 
Grape Juice 
Washington Certified 02/21/06 03/15/06 
2010 
(10) 
Asparagus California, Michigan, Washington Certified 04/27/10 06/25/10 
Catfish Nationwide Certified 04/27/10 06/25/10 
Shrimp Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Texas 
Certified 04/28/10 06/25/10 
Shrimp Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas 
Certified 07/14/10 09/24/10 
Lobster Connecticut Certified 07/14/10 09/24/10 
Lobster Maine Certified 07/14/10 09/24/10 
Lobster Massachusetts Certified 07/14/10 09/24/10 
Lobster New Hampshire Certified 07/14/10 09/24/10 
Lobster Rhode Island Certified 08/03/10 09/24/10 
Blueberries Maine Certified 08/03/10 10/05/10 
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Appendix II. Denied/Terminated Petitions (42 before ARRA, 15 after ARRA) 
 
Year Commodity State Denied/ 
Terminated 
Petition 
Date 
(MM/DD/YY) 
Decision 
Date 
(MM/DD/YY) 
2003 
(2) 
Salmon Oregon Denied 09/15/03 10/28/03 
Fresh Garlic California Denied 10/28/03 12/08/03 
2004 
(13) 
Olives California Denied 12/03/03 01/08/04 
Shrimp Florida Denied 11/18/03 01/12/04 
Rice National Denied 12/04/03 01/13/04 
Crawfish Louisiana Denied 12/04/03 01/15/04 
Shrimp Mississippi Denied 12/04/03 01/15/04 
Navel Oranges California Denied 02/02/04 03/15/04 
Catfish Michigan Denied 02/13/04 03/19/04 
Fresh Longan Florida Denied 02/23/04 04/04/04 
Alfafa seed Multistate (California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, 
Washington, Wyoming) 
Denied 02/23/04 04/05/04 
York apples Virginia Denied 02/23/04 04/05/04 
Shrimps Kentucky Denied 02/23/04 04/20/04 
Wild 
Blueberries 
Maine Terminated 09/15/03 10/08/04 
Catfish Multistate (Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Texas, Utah) 
Terminated 10/08/03 11/24/04 
2005 
(14) 
Seed Potatoes Washington Denied 01/13/05 03/04/05 
Cabbages New York Denied 02/11/05 03/21/05 
Shrimp Florida Terminated 02/23/04 04/18/05 
Avocados Florida Denied 03/08/05 04/28/05 
Salmon Alaska Terminated 09/15/03 10/18/05 
Salmon Washington Terminated 09/15/03 10/18/05 
Shrimp Mississippi Terminated 02/01/05 11/05/05 
Shrimp South Carolina Terminated 09/30/03 11/08/05 
Shrimp Georgia Terminated 10/21/03 11/08/05 
Shrimp Texas Terminated 10/21/03 11/08/05 
Shrimp Alabama Terminated 12/04/03 11/08/05 
Shrimp Arizona Terminated 02/13/04 11/08/05 
Shrimp North Carolina Terminated 02/23/04 11/08/05 
Shrimp Louisiana Terminated 11/18/04 11/08/05 
2006 
(7) 
Fresh Potatoes Idaho Terminated 02/11/05 03/23/06 
Concord Grape 
Juice 
Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio Terminated 02/25/05 03/23/06 
Olives California Terminated 01/21/05 03/24/06 
Fresh Potatoes Washington Denied 03/06/06 03/29/06 
Lychees Florida Terminated 02/23/04 04/12/06 
Avocados Florida Terminated 11/16/05 12/12/06 
2007 
(7) 
Snapdragons Indiana Terminated 12/28/05 02/01/07 
Concord Grape 
Juice 
Washington Terminated 02/21/06 02/01/07 
Concord Grape 
Juice 
Michigan Terminated 02/21/06 02/01/07 
Concord Grape 
Juice 
Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio Denied 02/16/07 03/22/07 
Burley Tobacco Kentucky. Tennessee, Virginia, North 
Carolina, 
West Virginia, Indiana, Ohio, 
Missouri 
Denied 02/16/07 03/22/07 
Honey Michigan Denied 02/16/07 03/22/07 
Avocados California Denied 02/15/07 04/06/07 
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Appendix II. Denied/Terminated Petitions (continued) 
 
2010 
(15) 
Spiny Lobster Florida Denied 04/27/10 - 
Cranberries New Jersey Denied 04/27/10 - 
Crawfish Louisiana Denied 04/27/10 - 
Blue Crab Georgia Denied 04/27/10 - 
Apples Michigan Denied 04/28/10 - 
Prunes and 
Dried Plums 
California Denied 04/28/10 09/20/10 
Coffee Puerto Rico Denied 07/14/10 09/20/10 
Wool Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming Denied 07/14/10 09/20/10 
Wool Montana Denied 07/14/10 - 
Lamb Ohio Denied 07/23/10 09/20/10 
Lamb Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming Denied 07/23/10 09/20/10 
Apples Maine Denied 07/30/10 09/20/10 
Multi-species 
Fish 
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island 
Denied 08/03/10 10/06/10 
Tilapia Arkansas Denied 08/03/10 10/05/10 
Blueberries New Hampshire Denied 08/13/10 10/05/10 
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Appendix III. Variable Description 
Category Variable name Description 
Petition 
variables 
petition  Whether or not a petition is filed (0 or 1) 
approval Whether or not a filed petition for TAA is approved (0 or 1) 
previously_ap
proved 
Whether the commodity had been petitioned and approved ever before (0 or 1) 
petition_new Whether the petition is a new petition or is filed for a re-evaluation (0 or 1) 
re_petition Whether a petition has been ever filed before for the same commodity (Excluded the 
cases for automatic re-assessment by ERS) (0 or 1)  
multistate Whether the petition was filed by a group of states (0 or 1) 
cv Coefficient of variation of commodity prices (based on 5 preceding year’s price data) 
Eligibility 
criteria 
eligible_price5 Eligibility in 5 year price criterion (0 or 1) 
eligible_price3 Eligibility in 3 year price criterion (0 or 1) 
eligible_impor
t 
If import quantity in the petition year has increased compared to the previous year (0 
or 1) 
eligible_impor
t5 
If import quantity in the petition year has increased compared to the previous 5-year-
average (0 or 1) 
chg_impqty5 Change of import quantity in the petition year from the five year average (%) 
chg_imptval5 Change of import value in the petition year from the five year average (%) 
eligible_incom
e 
If net farm income has decreased compared to the previous year (0 or 1) 
eligible_pricei
mport 
Interaction term of price and import eligibility. (0 or 1) 
eligible_all Interaction term of price, income and import eligibility. (0 or 1) 
State farm 
characteris
tics 
farmsize Average farm size of the state in the petition year (acres) (2002 and 2007 data) 
avg_age Average operator age (years) (2002 and 2007 data) 
primary Farms with farming as principal farm operators' primary occupation (%) (2002 and 
2007 data) 
full_owner Percentage of full ownership farmers (%) (2002 and 2007 data) 
indiv Percentage of individual/family, sole proprietorship farms (%)(2002 and 2007 data) 
corp Percentage of non-family corporation farms (%)(2002 and 2007 data) 
top5 Whether the commodity is of top 5 agricultural commodity of the state (in value of 
receipt in 2008) (0 or 1) 
hrs_worked Average hours worked per week in the state in petition year (hours) 
tfp Total factor productivity of the state (2002, 2003, 2004 data) 
somecollege Percentage of rural population with age 25 or older with college degree or some 
college or upper education (2000 data) (%) 
chg_govpmt Change in the direct government payment from previous year to the petition year (%) 
(yearly data) 
chgsign_govp
mt 
If direct government payment has increased in the petition year (0 or 1) (yearly data) 
extension_rati
o 
Number of extension staff per 1,000 farmers in 1997  
farm_advisor_
ratio 
Number of farm and home management advisors per 1,000 farmers in the state, as of 
one year before petition date (2002 and 2007 data) 
Farm 
productivit
y measures 
tfp Total factor productivity of the state (2002, 2003, 2004 data) 
agri_pr_farm Value of agricultural production/number of farms (million dollars/farm) (2002-2007) 
crop_pr_farm Value of crop production/number of farms (million dollars/farm) (2002-2007) 
agri_pr_acre Value of agricultural production/farmland (thousand dollars/acre) (2002-2007) 
crop_pr_acre Value of crop production/farmland (thousand dolloars/acre) (2002-2007) 
State and 
year 
dummy 
stAL ~ stWY State dummy for 50 states in the US 
yr04~yr07 Year dummy from 2004 to 2007  
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